The dictatorship of the sociobrain. by Constantinides, Andreas
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers 
1-1-1981 
The dictatorship of the sociobrain. 
Andreas Constantinides 
University of Windsor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Constantinides, Andreas, "The dictatorship of the sociobrain." (1981). Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations. 6757. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6757 
This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor 
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, 
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, 
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder 
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would 
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or 
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email 
(scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208. 
THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE SOCIOBRAIN
by
Andreas Constantinides
A Thesis
submitted to the'Faculty of Graduate Studies 
through the Department of 
Sociology and Anthropology in Partial Fulfillment 
of the requirements for the Degree 
of Master of Arts at 
The University of Windsor
Windsor, Ontario, Canada 
1981
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EC54740
IN FO R M A TIO N  T O  USER S
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations 
and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
UM I Microform E C 5 4 7 4 0  
Copyright 2010  by ProQuest LLC 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
© Andreas Constantinides 1 981 All Rights Reserved
764712
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DEDICATION.
These pages are dedicated to all humans, great and 
small. To the great, because of their courage in running 
and flying. And to the small, because of their cowardice in 
dragging their feet. Without the great, the human race 
would be lost into the mud. And without the small, it would 
be lost into the vertigo,
, Especially, I dedicate this labour to Heraclitos, 
who reminded us that “everything is in flux", and to Socra­
tes - that great philosopher - whose wisdom reached such a 
l&ght as to make him say: “only one thing I learned in 
life: my ignorance is limitless".
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ABSTRACT
THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE SOCIOBRAIN
by
Andreas Constantinides
The subject of this study is the relationship between 
the individual and society as studied by sociobiology, the 
social sciences (specifically, sociology and anthropology), 
and philosophy.
At first, the premises of sociobiology are presented,
i
with the main focus on Edward 0. Wilson1s Sociobiology: The 
New Synthesis (1975a), which is regarded, anonymously, as 
the “bible” of the new discipline. In addition to Wilson, on
r
the side of sociobiology, the views of David P. Barash(1977) 
and Pierre L. van den Berghe (gregory, 1978:33-52), are pre­
sented and discussed. , ,
In the process, the claim of sociobiology that “beha­
vior and social structure, like all other biological pheno­
mena, can'be studied as ‘organs,1 extensions of the genes 
that exist because of their superior adaptive value” (Wil­
son, 1975a:22), is contrasted with the dominant sociological 
and anthropological views that social phenomena (including 
social behavior), can be studied only at the level of the 
social realm. Among the sociologists examined are Auguste
v
iii
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Corate, Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim. On the side of 
anthropology, the arguments come from Marshal Sahlins (1977) 
who emphasizes the "fact of Culture". From the domain of 
philosophy (some would say - still - anthropology), the view
\
of Teilhard de Chardin, as presented in his book The Pheno­
menon of Man (1955)» and the view of Michael Ruse (1-979) > 
are discussed. In addition, the arguments of several biolo­
gists (Waddington, Wald, Miller and Weiss), and those of The 
Sociobiology Study Group of the Science for the People are 
presented.
The discussion brings out the fact that the arguments 
' , ' 
presented are a continuation, as Barash suggests, of one of
the oldest and "least productive" debates in the history of
science, namely, the debate concerned with the underlying
t
causes of behavior which is manifested in the conflict des- 
cribed, variously, as instinct versus learning, nature ver­
sus nurture, or endogenous versus exogenous control of be­
havior (Barash, 1977:39)*
But this discussion does not lead to the conclusion 
that Barash - and sociobiology, in general - arrive at: that 
"insofar as genes specify the organization of nerve cells, 
just as they specify the organization of bone cells, there 
is every reason to accept a role of genes in producing beha­
vior, just as we accept a role of genes in producing stru­
cture" (Barash, 1977:57).
.iv
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The conclusion is that Wilson, Barash and sociobio­
logy, in general, see only one type of DNA: the one that 
acts in such a way as to achieve an equilibrium between the 
individual and his environment (both physical and social), 
for the survival and reproduction of the individual human. 
Sociobiology ignores, or -at least- downplays the importance 
of another type of DNA: the one that acts in such a v/ay as 
determine the nature of such an equilibrium; the DNA 
which has as the sole purpose of its existence the survival 
and reproduction of the human group: The Sociobrain. The 
collective ways of acting or thinking which have, according 
to Durkheim, a reality "outside" the individuals (Giddens, 
1972:71), and which are manifested in philosophy, science, 
arts, the communication media etc.).
In the past, because of the limited scope and the 
simplicity of the social realm (Sociobrain), humans enjoyed 
a high degree of independence (through, both the effortless 
internalization of the social realm and its limited scope). 
But, the expanding sophistication of the Sociobrain (espe­
cially with regard to scientific and technological develop­
ments), permits an individual human to master only a tiny 
fraction of it, a fact which does not promote individuality 
and creates a cybernetic relationship between the•individu­
al and society based on the Dictatorship of the Sociobrain.
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PREFACE
One of the biggest questions of our time is v/hether 
the individual human being should be left to act and think 
in freedom or submit to the social demands* These choices 
quite often go hand in hand and complement each other; how­
ever, in many instances they conflict gravely*
l
In the past this conflict was displayed in philoso­
phical doctrines, in general, and religious ideologies, in 
particular: It is apparent, for example, in The Re-public of
Plato  ^ , in which the author discusses "The virtues in the 
%
State" (Plato, 1973:119-129), and "The virtues in the Indi­
vidual" (pp* 139-1*0)• Aristotle is another of the pre-chri- 
stian Greeks who dealt v/ith the relationship between the in­
dividual and society in his book The Politics, in which he 
suggested that man is "by nature a social being" and he, 
according to Barnes,
pointed out the necessity of social rela­
tions for the complete development of the 
human personality, and he made plain the 
abnormality of the non-social being (Bar­
nes, 1970:8)*
Later on, this conflict is dealt v/ith by the Christi-
vii
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an religion and the New Testament, whose authors, by empha­
sizing the individuality of man (as an immortal soul), as 
well as the brotherhood of man, managed - somehow - to sa­
tisfy both positions. ,
During the last two hundred years, especially after 
the publication of the Communist Manifesto, in l8Jf8, the 
conflict became an integral part of political theorizing and 
advocacy, under the following labels: Communism, Socialism, 
National Socialism, Anarchism, Demecracy, Conservatism, Li­
beralism, Social Democracy, New Left etc. In more recent ye­
ars all these political ideologies have been polarized into 
two opposing camps: On the one hand the ideology of Socia­
lism (encompassing Communism), and on the other the ideolo­
gies of Democracy and Liberalism with the common denominator 
of individualism.
While this conflict occurs in the politicoeconomic 
sphere, and philosophical pursuits, it is manifested in the 
scientific realm as well. Scientific ideas with implications 
relevant to the conflict originated in the middle of the 
19th century with the publication of Auguste Comte*s Posi­
tive Philosophy (1858) and Charles Darwin*s The OrifdLns of
\
Species (1859). Both writers v/ere dealing with human nature, 
in general, and - in particular - the nature of the group 
(the former), and the nature of the individual (the latter).
/
viii
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p
Comte , beleived that the Vreal" human existence 
began "by its extension from the individual to the colle­
ctive organism" (Comte, 1875:825-826), and he argues that, 
likewise, the beiQ.f in the rule of God (Theocracy) and the 
worship of God (Theolatry), both characteristics of Theolo­
gy, should be replaced by the rule and the worship of Soci­
ety (Sociocracy and Sociolatry), values derived from the 
practice of sociology (p.326).
By using what he calls Positive Philosophy ^ , Comte 
arrives at the conclusion that the European history ^ went 
through three great epochs: a) Speculative life, b) Active 
life and c) Affective life, representing - in the same or­
der - Intellect, Energy and Feeling . These three "essen­
tial modes of human existence" (Comte, 1875:325) , were "har 
irioniously united "under the primitive systems of theocracy" 
but "that unity, becoming soon oppressive, long ago ceased, 
and has never yet been restored" (p.325)* Comte sees the 
■19th century as ripe time for the "restoration" of this uni 
ty. He writes:
the time has arrived for the foundation of 
a complete and final synthesis, in which a 
wider sphere will be given for the simulta­
neous action of Intellect, Energy, and Fe­
eling, than each could separately find ei­
ther in Greek civilisation, Roman citizen­
ship, or Catholic-feudal discipline (Comte, 
1875:325-326).
This "complete and final synthesis" is seen by Comte
ix
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as talcing place not in any kind of "primitive system of the­
ocracy", but in the reigning of the "permanent government 
of Humanity" (p.325)* The Great Being of God is replaced, in 
this "final religion" (p.326), by the Great Being of Huma­
nity (p.327).
The final synthesis, which is brought about by the
establishment of Humanity as the supreme being, is based on
£
"definite laws" (p.328), which can be demonstrated . And 
the- onus of the demonstration of these laws falls on the 
shoulders of a new discipline which Comte christened socio­
logy (sociologie).
In order to arrive at the demonstrable laws of soci­
ology, Comte discusses Positive Philosophy, of which he 
distinguishes two aspects: 1) Cosmology, which is occupied 
with the study of "the whole group of inorganic science", 
and 2) Biology, the "study of life" (Comte, 1873:355). The 
author regards both Cosmology and Biology as "introductory 
principles", and as "the twofold basis of the great final 
study, that of Humanity" (p.355). And as he sees an "inva­
riability of external relations" in both Cosmology and Bio­
logy, he does, likewise, in his examination of Humanity 
(p.356):
Comte*s examination of Humanity, or his study of the 
"Social Physics", begins with his belief that "Humanity suc-
.x
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ceeds to Animality, as Animality to Vegetality”, a princible 
which he sees, in “its synthetic form*1, as the “Hierarchy of 
life”. And he regards these modes (Vegetality, Animality and 
Humanity), as the "trible foundation” on which the analyti­
cal processes of life should rest. Without this foundation,
/
Comte states, there is the danger of falling into ”specula­
tions” and “interminable disputes” in the examination of Hu­
manity. And the same confusion occurs, if there is an at­
tempt for the examination of Animality without its relation
to Humanity. He writes:
We shall inevitably fall into vague and use­
less speculations and interminable disputes, 
if we attempt to construct the second term,
the series of animal life, independently of
the first and of the final term. To do so
would be to build at once without foundation 
and without purpose (Comte, 1875:501)*
•  i
«
The transition from the animal to the human, or so­
cial mode of existence, is seen by Comte as “even more di­
rect and definite” and consisting “simply in development of 
the internal functions of the brain” (p.501). The develop­
ment of the internal functions of the brain is discussed by 
Comte in the concepts of Egoism and Altruism (p.558). Ego­
ism is a characteristic of the personal Affective Life 
which is found “in the very lowest forms of life, those in 
which there is no separation, or incomplete separation, of 
sexes", and Altruism is a characteristic of the social Af­
fective Life, which is exhibited by man as well as by “most
r
\
xi
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of the higher animals" (p.558)*
•fitrfe Although Comte sees this connection between Ve- 
' getality, Animality and Humanity, as well as the limits im­
posed by the "constant and irresistible pressure of the en­
vironment" on the living organism*s "tendency to vary" (p.
t
357)» he ignored them when dealing with the abstract theo­
ries of sociology. He writes:
Ultimately no doubt the sociologist will 
have to take careful cognisance of such 
conditions as those of climate and of 
race, which when dealing with the abstract 
theories of sociology, I have systemati­
cally kept out of sight (p.353)*
Comte did not find it necessary to deal with environ­
mental and genetic ("racial11) factors, although he saw so­
ciological science as "incomplete" without them (p.353). And 
he urged "those high intellects" who are called to a "sacer­
dotal mission" to devote themselves to questions of Socio- 
cracy and Sociolatry, of which he says:
Intellectually both fields of practical 
enquiry are inexhaustible, and morally 
they are most valuable. The improvement 
of our conduct, private or public, and 
above all, the elevation of"the feelings 
from which it springs, are studies open 
to all and yet offering problems for the 
strongest minds (pp.353-35 k ) •
Corate was a practical scientist (his elaboration of
xii
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Positive Philosophy and of Social Physics makes this undis- 
putable), but he was a revolutionary thinker, as well, who 
was reacting to the religious doctrines of his time (Theo­
cracy and Theolatry). This inevitably led him to emphasize 
the need for the individual to submit to the rule and wor­
ship of society (Sociocracy and Sociolatry), at the expense 
of more elaborate scientific pursuits with regard to the na­
tural relationship between the environment and the indivi­
dual and the individual and society (what Comte calls vege- 
tality, animality and humanity).
But what was not emhasized by Comte (environmental 
and biological factors), it became the central theme of
O  Q
Charles Darwin ' and Herbert Spencer . Darwin attempted 
to explain human nature as the result of an organic evolu­
tionary process subject to natural selection not unlike 
that of other animals, and Spencer saw the individual as a 
distinct part of the social group. Although Spencer compares 
society to an organism ^ with characteristics similar to 
those of the individual human, he writes that,
The defective natures of citizens will show 
themselves in the bad acting of whatever so­
cial structure they are arranged into. There 
is no political alchemy by which you can get 
golden conduct out of leaden instincts (Spen­
cer, 1893:333)*
Comte*s introduction of sociology as a discipline 
studying the "definite laws" of Humanity (Comte, 1873:328),
xiii
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did not bring about the demise of theology (theocracy and
theolatry). Still, in the last quarter of the twentieth cen-
bury, there are those v;ho worship God and believe in crea- 
i n
tion . Sociologists followed Comte*s suggestion to deal, 
primarily, with questions of sociocracy and sociolatry, and 
ignored - altogether - his caution that "ultimately no doubt 
the sociologist will have to take careful cognisance of such 
conditions as those of climate and of race" (Comte, 1875: 
553). Sociologists ignored Comte*s important postulate that 
cosmology and biology are "the twofold basis of the great 
final study, that of Humanity" (p*355).
\
What sociologists ignored became the focus of evolu­
tionary biology, which built on Darwin's evolutionary theo­
ry. Recently (in 1975), the biologist Edward 0. Wilson pub­
lished a book titled Sociobiology; The Hew Synthesis, in 
which he postulates a relationship between the biological 
base of an organism and its social behavior. The "final syn­
thesis11 of Comte in which "a wider sphere will be given for 
the simultaneous action of Intellect, Energy, and Feeling11, 
a sphere representing the "permanent government of Humanity" 
(Comte, 1875:325-326), is transformed by Wilson into a "new 
synthesis". There is a great distinction though; >Vhereas, 
Comte sees Humanity as a "Great Being" regulated by "defi­
nite lav/s'1, studied by sociology, Wilson looks at the "mo­
rality of the gene" (1975a 3^), studied by evolutionary bio­
logy (specifically its subdiscipline, sociobiology)^ to ex-
xiv
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plain human social behavior. This distinction is the subject 
of this study.
NOTES
1. The Republic of Plato, 1973. Especially in the chapters
entitled "The Virtues in the State” and "The Virtues in 
the Individual”,
2. The Positive Philosophy. 1858
3. John Stuart Mill summarizes as follows Positive Philoso­
phy: "Positive Philosophy maintains that within the exist­
ing order of the universe, or rather of the part of it 
known to us, the direct determining cause of every pheno­
menon is not supernatural but natural........... Who­
ever regards all eVents as parts of a constant order, each 
one being the invariable consequent of some antecedent 
condition, or combination of conditions, accepts fully the 
Positive mode of thought: whether he acknowledges or not 
an universal antecedent on which the whole system of na­
ture was originally consequent, and whether that universal 
antecedent is conceived as an Intelligence or not (Mill,
1965:15).
Comte regards the people of the rest of the world as "po­
pulations of less advanced growth”, in comparison with the 
civilisation of the "regenerated West” (Comte, 1875:353).
5. The speculative life (intellect), is seen by Comte as the 
essence of the Greek civilisation, the active life (ener­
gy), represents the Roman citizenship, and the affective 
life (feeling), the Catholic-feudal discipline (pp.325- 
326) .
6. This prompts Comte to call, alternatively, the new reli­
gion as "Religion of Demonstration" (p.337).
7. In The Origin of Species.(1859)■
8. The Social Organism, (i860).
xv
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9* The Social Organism, (1860)
10. The reference here is to the legal suit brought by Kel­
ly Segraves, 11 the Baptist head of a group promoting the 
Biblical version of creation11, against the California 
Department of Education demanding the teaching, in 
schools of divine creation (Globe and Mail newspaper, 
June 20, 1981:12), Toronto, Canada.
xvi
/
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INTRODUCTION
In defining sociobiology, Wilson 0975a:*f) writes 
, that it is "the study of the "biological basis of all social 
behavior11, and it is formulated by the integration of pre­
cepts of evolutionary biology into modern population biolo­
gy (1975aslf).
Central concepts in modern population biology (con­
cepts which have been adopted "by sociobiology), are kin se­
lection and reciprocal altruism (pp.117-120). The importance 
of these concepts is due to the fact that they transfer the 
unit of natural selection from the individual organism to
\
the group, a transfer which "solves11 what is described by 
Wilson as the "central" theoretical problem of sociobiology: 
"how can altruism, which by definition reduces personal fit-
1
I
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ness, possibly evolve by natural selection?’* (p.3).
Besides kin selection and reciprocal altruism, natu­
ral selection is another concept taken over by sociobiology 
from the area of modern population biology (or ’’neo-Darwin­
ist evolutionary theory”, as Wilson calls it - p.Jf)* Natu­
ral selection is defined as ’’the change in relative frequ­
ency in genotypes due to differences in the ability of 
their phenotypes to obtain representation in the next gene­
ration” (p.67)* In order to emphasize the importance of the 
"dogma” of natural selection in evolutionary biology (of 
which sociobiology is a branch - p.4)» Wilson writes:
The pervasive role of natural selection in 
shaping all classes of traits in organisms 
can be fairly called the central dogma of 
evolutionary biology. When relentlessly 
pressed, this proposition may not produce 
an absolute truth, but it is, as G.C. Wil­
liams disarmingly put the matter, the light 
and the v;ay, A large part of the contribu­
tion of Konrad Lorenz and his fellow etho­
logists can be framed in the same metaphor. 
They convinced us that behavior and social 
structure, like all other biological pheno­
mena, can be studied as ’organs,1 extensions 
of the genes that exist because of their 
superior adaptive value (Wilson, 1975a:21-22).
Natural selection is ’’relentlessly” pressed in soci­
obiology. And it is not only regarded as the process by 
which ’’prolonged individual survival” and ’’superior mating 
performance” (survival and reproduction), are selected. Na­
tural selection is extended to behavior and social stru-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3cture, as well as to "complex social behaviors" (p.3)- Such 
complex social behaviors are seen by'Wilson as those depen­
dent on love, hate, aggression, fear, expansiveness etc, (p, 
k )• Wilson suggests, iri essence, that natural selection se­
lection "selected" the genes that were capable of love, hate 
e'tc., and the uncapable ones perished. So, by analysing the 
existing genes (by "tearing down the machinery" - p.575)» it 
would be possible'for social behavior to be explained in 
terms of the properties of the cells. He writes:
stress will be evaluated in terms of the neu- 
rophysiological perturbations and their rela­
xation times. Cognition will be translated 
into circuity. Learning and creativeness ’will 
be defined as the alteration of specific por­
tions of the cognitive machinery regulated by 
input from the emotive centers (p.573)»
Critics of Wilson’s ideas,and postulates, concerning 
sociobiology do not accept this role of the genes in deter- 
minig behavior, especially in the case of the humans. One
'i
such a critic is C.H. V/addington . V/addington notes that 
Wilson
is broad-minded enough to bring out the fact, 
which most orthodox evolutionists try to keep 
in decent obscurity, that selection operates 
directly on phenotypes, that is to say on or­
ganisms after they have been affected during 
their development by the environment as well 
as by the genes they contain (Caplan, 1978:
256).
\
But the importance of phenotypic adaptation, according
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kto V/addington, ’'hardly gets a mention" by Y/ilson beyond the 
"early introductory part of his book, and when in the main 
text gets down to cases" (p.256). V/addington sees this as a 
"defect" of V/ilson, and he is asking for more emphasis on 
"phenotypic adaptation", which is "another way of refferring 
to learning" and a phrase "broad enough to encompass modifi­
cation of physical structure as well as of behavior" (p.256). 
The author sees learning and the "topic of communication" as 
a "much more central issue in sociobiology than the problem
of altruism". And.he concludes:
/
If one is going to discuss the evolution of 
social behavior with the aim of bringing it 
into connection with human social behavior, 
which is almost wholly learned, then ’learn­
ing, ' and the genetic basis for learning, 
must have an absolutely central position in 
the argument (p.256).
Ek’ora an anthropological point of view, Marshal Sah-
1 2lins sees sociobiology as ignoring the "fact of culture". 
According to Sahlins, culture is "biology plus the symbolic 
faculty", and a "theory of meaning" is needed to'explain 
culture and not biology. And he sees biology, or any other 
"law of nature" (physical and chemical laws), as relating 
to a "fact of culture",
only as a limit does to a form, a constant 
to a difference, and a matrix to a practice. 
It will never be possible to explain the 
cultural properties of any such fact by re­
ferring it to underlying contents of a dif-
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ferent order (Sahlins,1977:65-66).
Another critic of sociobiology, biologist Georgev
Wald ^ , writes the following:
f
What impresses me most about the new socio­
biology is its massive irrelevance to the 
present human condition. It is a little late 
to begin tracing our present state and its 
problems back to genetic sources. The genes 
are only permissive. We exploit our genetic 
potentialities less and less as we assume 
more and more specialized roles in more and 
more urbanized, mechanized, and industria­
lized societies. The limiting factors in 
modern human performance are primarily so­
cial, economic, and political (Gregory, 
1978:277).
In this study, the positions and postulates of socio­
biology - especially, human sociobiology - will be consider­
ed, and relevant criticisms will be examined, with a view at 
synthesizing the opposing views.
NOTES
1. “Mindless Societies”, The Sociobiology Debate. 1978.
2. The Use and Abuse of Biology. 1977
5. "The Human Condition”, Sociobiology and Human Nature. 
1978.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
THE ESSENCE OF SOCIOBIOLOGY
The general term "sociobiology", according to Edward 
O* V/ilson  ^ was used independently by John P. Scott in 19^6 
and by Charles F. Hockett in 19^8, but the word was not 
picked up immediately by others* In 1950, Scott, who had 
been serving as secretary of the small but influential Com­
mittee for the Study of Animal Behavior, suggested sociobi­
ology more formally as a term for the
interdisciplinary science which lies be­
tween the fields of biology (particular­
ly ecology and pphysiology) and psycho­
logy and sociology (Gregory, 1978:3).
When V/ilson, in 1975* published his controversial 
book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, in which he suggested 
that a discrete discipline should be built on a "foundation 
of genetics and population biology" (p.3)> he selected the 
term sociobiology rather than some other, novel expression, 
because he "believed it would already be familiar to most
6
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cepted" (p.3).
The terra sociobiology may has been accepted, but the 
acceptance of the essence of Wilson's book is highly ques­
tionable: According to Marshal Sahlins 2 , Wilson's book
has occasioned a crisis of connaissance and 
conscience, of knowledge and public con­
sciousness, with overtones as much politi­
cal or ideological as they have been acade­
mic (Sahlins, 1977:)*
/ —
Numerous books and articles have been published in 
support", or repudiation of the positions taken by Wilson.
\
The framework in which sociobiology is discussed by 
Wilson is the neo-Darwinian evolutionary.theory: evolutio­
nary biology integrated in "modern population biology" (Wil­
son, 1975a:*f). Central concepts in modern population biology 
are kin selection and reciprocal altruism (pp.117-120). The 
' importance of these concepts is due to their transfering of 
the unit of natural selection from the individual organism 
to the group and, thereby, "solving" what is described by 
Wilson as the "central" theoretical problem of socioliolo- 
gy: "how can altruism, which by definition reduces personal 
fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection?-" (p.3) •
Wilson sees William D. Hamilton as the person who
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spite" which, through the concept of inclusive fitness ^ , 
led to the theory of kin selection, according to which,
blood relatives cooperate or bestow altru­
istic favors on one another in a way that 
increases the average genetic fitness of- 
the members of the network as a whole, even 
when this behavior reduces the individual 
fitness of certain members of the group 
(Wilson, 1975a:117).
The concept of reciprocal altruism was initiated by 
Robert L. Trivers ^ , and deals with altruism manifested a- 
mong individuals without blood relations between them: The 
"good Samaritan behavior in human beings" (p.120), Recipro­
cal altruism suggests that the "good Samaritan" has "much to 
gain by his act". This concept is based on the assumption 
that the altruist anticipates a future payoff to his altru­
istic act (reciprocity), which will be much greater than his 
own offering, since the ob.ject in an altruistic act gains 
more -with regard to his fitness <*■ than the subject loses 
with regard to his . Wilson gives the example of a drown­
ing man where the endangered individual has a one-half 
chance of dying and the altruist (rescuer), a one-tenth 
chance. And, the altruist, at present, risks a one-tenth 
chance of losing his life in anticipation of benefiting from 
a one-half chance of saving his life, on some possible time 
in the future (p.120) • Wilson sees Trivers as "skillfully" 
relating reciprocal altruism to a wide range of the most
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Aggressively moralistic behavior, for ex­
ample, keeps would-be cheaters in line - 
no less than hortatory sermons to the be­
lievers. Self-righteousness, gratitude, 
and sympathy enhance the probability of 
receiving an altruistic act by virtue of 
implying reciprocation. The all-important 
quality of sincerity is a metacommunica­
tion about the significance of these mes­
sages. The emotion of guilt may be favored 
in natural selection because it motivates 
the cheater to compensate for his misdeed 
and to provide convincing evidence that he 
does not plan to cheat again (p.120).
Besides kin selection and reciprocal altruism, natu­
ral selection is another premise taken over by sociobiology 
from the neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. Natural sele­
ction is defined as "the change in relative frequency in ge­
notypes due to differences in the ability of their pheno­
types to obtain representation in the next generation (Wil­
son, 1975a:67)* The change in the relative frequencies in 
genotypes, or "the variation in competence", according to 
the premise of natural selection,
can stem from many causes: different abi­
lities in direct competition with other 
genotypes; differential survival under the 
onslaught of parasites, predators, and 
changes in the physical environment; vari­
able reproductive competence; variable a- 
bility to penetrate new habitats; and so 
forth (p.67).
The role of natural selection in shaping all classes
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of traits in organism, according to Wilson, can not be over- 
estimated. He sees natural selection as the “central dogma" 
of evolutionary biology, vihich, v/hen relentlessly pressed,
this proposition may not produce an abso­
lute truth, but it is, as G.C. Williams 
disarmingly put the matter, the light and 
the way. A large part of the contribution 
of Konrad Lorenz and his fellow etholo-; 
gists can be framed in the same metaphor. 
They convinced us that behavior and social 
structure, like all other biological phe­
nomena, can be studied as ‘organs,* exten­
sions of the genes that exist because of 
their superior adaptive value (Wilson, 
1975:21-22) 7 .
The introduction of the concepts of kin selection and 
family selection salvages, according to Wilson, the old Dar­
winian theory of biological evolution and natural selection,
O
in contrast to the Lamarckian evolutionary theory which 
does not “recover" from its “inability" to explain the exis­
tence of sterile organisms (Wilson, 1975a:117) ^ . Although 
the unit of natural selection, with the introduction of the 
neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, was transfered from the 
individual organism to the kin (and by the reciprocal altru­
ism to a social group), the level of the selection still re-
10mains, unwaveringly , the gene of the individual organism.
The importance of the gene:
The most basic element of examination in sociobiolo­
gy is the gene. The gene, defined by Wilson as "the basic
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unit of heredity" (Wilson, 1975a:585), is composed of DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid), which is “the basic hereditary ma­
terial of all kinds of organisms" (p.582)* In higher orga­
nisms, including animals, "the great bulk of DNA is located 
within the chromosomes" (p.382), which are found in the nu­
cleus of a cell. The larger unit is the cell. The cell is 
composed of many parts (lysosome, nuclear membrane, endo­
plasmic reticulum etc.). One part of the cell is the nucle­
us where the chromosomes reside. And within the chromosomes 
there are the genes which are composed of DNA.
In order to emphasize the importance of the genes in 
the sociobiological explanation of social behavior, Wilson
says that individual organisms are "only" a vehicle for the
genes, and "part of an elaborate device to preserve and 
spread them with the least possible biochemical perturbation 
(Wilson, 1975a.:3)* In order to disperse any doubts about his 
position he continues:
Samuel Butler*s famous aphorism, that the 
chicken is only an egg's way of making a- 
nother egg, has been modernized: the orga­
nism is only DNA's way of maiding more DNA.
More to the point, the hypothalamus and
limbic system are engineered to perpetu­
ate DNA (p.3).
The genes - as well as the hypothalamus and limbic 
system - evolve, according to Wilson, by "natural sele­
ction".. And this "simple** biological statement "must be pur-
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sued to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if not e- 
pistemology and epistemologists, at all depths" (Wilson,
1975a:3).
A Rudimentary Science:
Sociobiology, according to Wilson, is still a "rudi­
mentary" science, and "its relavance to human social sys­
tems is still largely unexplored" (Gregory, 1978:12), Wil­
son does not see biology reaching its "peak" before the 
"end of the twenty-first century" (Wilson, 1975:57^)* And,
only when the machinery can be torn down 
on paper at the level of the cell and put 
together again will the properties of e- 
motion and ethical judgement come clear 
(P.575).
After the machinery is torn down (read: analysis of
i
DNA and identification of loci), Wilson suggests,
simulations can then be employed to esti­
mate the full range of behavioral respon­
ses and the precision of their homeostatic 
- controls (p,575) 11 • \
In "tearing" down the machinery, V/ilson says, the ro­
le of evolutionary sociobiology will be twofold:
It will attempt to reconstruct the history 
of the machinery and to identify the adap-
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tive significance of each of its func­
tions. .The second contribution
of evolutionary sociobiology will be to 
monitor the genetic basis of social be­
havior (p.373)*
In doing his part in reconstructing the "history of 
the machinery", in identifying the "adaptive significance of 
each of its functions", and in monitoring "the genetic basis 
of social behavior", Wilson attempts a "general synthesis" 
of the available knowledge with regard to population biolo­
gy, invertebrate zoology, including entomology especially, 
and vertebrate zoology - including humans (p.v).
- At first, Wilson constructs several "elementary con­
cepts of sociobiology" ranging from definitions of society 
and the individual organism to the specification of such
common social behavior as communication and coordination
12(Wilson, 1975a:7-31) . These concepts apply indiscrimi­
nately to verterbrates (including humans) and invertebrates. 
And he proceeds by making "an attempt to codify sociobiology 
into a branch of evolutionary biology and particularly of 
modern population biology" (p.4) ^  .
Wilson sees the theory of sociobiology as deriving, 
in general terms, from the study of the "evolutionary and e- 
cological parameters" (Historical constrains, environmental 
factors, intensity of environmental fluctuation, which lead 
- in their totality - to the theory of evolutionary ecolo-
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gy), combined with the population parameters (individual 
birth and death schedules, equilibrial population densities, 
gene flow between populations, coefficients of relation­
ships), and the behavioral parameters (raodiflability of in­
dividual behavior) (V/ilson, 1975:5)*
)
Human Sociobiology;
Employing the concepts presented earlier (kin sele- 
, ction, natural selection etc.), and taking into considera­
tion the ecological parameters, population parameters, and 
behavioral parameters, V/ilson examines the social behavior 
of such diverse organisms as fruit flies, starlings, mon­
keys etc. But these examinations are irrelevant to the pre­
sent study (at least, in their specificity). This study is 
concerned with human sociobiology.
With regard to humans, Wilson distinguishes social 
evolution in two stages relating to the *'acceleration in 
mental evolution” (Wilson, 1975a:565)* The firts stage "oc- 
cured during the transition from a larger arboreal primate 
to the first man-apes (Australopithicus)”, which change 
”may have required as much as ten million years” and culmi­
nated between five and three million years ago (p.565)- The 
second, ”much more rapid phase of acceleration began about 
100.000 years ago” and it, according to Wilson,
consisted primarily of cultural evolution
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and must have been mostly phenotypic in 
nature, building upon the genetic poten­
tial in the brain that had accumulated 
over the previous millions of years. The 
brain had reached a threshold, and a 
wholly new, enormously more rapid form 
of mental evolution took over (p.565).
The change from a larger "arboreal primate" (Ramapi- 
'thecus), to Australopithicus and from there to humans is 
attributed by V/ilson to the change of habitat. Whereas Ra- 
mapithicus "lived in forests and was adapted for progression 
through trees by arm swinging", man - together with "a very 
few other large-bodied primates" - left the forest "to spend 
most of their lives on the ground in open habitats" (V/ilson, 
1975a:566-567)• Proceeding from here, and adopting "fossil 
evidence, extrapolations back from extant hunter-gatherer 
societies, and comparisons with other living primate spe­
cies" (p,567), V/ilson subscribes to the autocatalysis model, 
which,
holds that when the earliest hominids be-’ 
came bipedal as part of their terrestrial 
adaptation, their hands were freed, the 
manufacture and handling of artifacts was 
made easier, and intelligence grew as part 
of the improvement of the tool-using habit. 
V/ith mental capacity and the tendency to 
use artifacts increasing through mutual re­
inforcement, the entire materials-based 
culture expanded (pp,567-563)•
Natural selection and evolution continues, always ac­
cording to Wilson, to transform man. The "increase in brain 
size" and the refinement of stone artifacts "indicate agra-
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dual improvement in mental capacity throughout the Pleisto 
cene" (p.569)* And v/ith the appearance of the Mousterian 
tool culture of Homo sapiens nearderthalensis some 75*000 
years ago,
\
the trend gathered momentum, giving way in 
Europe to the Upper Paleolithic culture of 
Homo sapiens about /j-0.000 years B.P* Start­
ing about 10.000 years ago agricultulture 
was invented and spread, populations in­
creased enormously in density, and the pri­
mitive hunter-gatherer bands gave way lo­
cally to the relentless growth of tribes, 
chiefdoms, and states. Finally, after A.D. 
1if00 European-based civilizations shifted 
gears again, and knowledge and technology 
grew not just exponentially but superexpo- 
nentially (p.569).
J
The first stage in mental evolution - from Ramapithe- 
cus to Australopithecus - was, according to V/ilson, a result 
of the change of habitat and, as such, it was environmental­
ly induced "no different from those that have guided the so­
cial evolution of other animal species” (p57^). The second 
stage "in which the most distinctive human qualities emer­
ged”, is seen by Wilson as "depending" more on "internal re­
organization and less on direct responses to features in the 
surrounding environment" (p.57^). But, in making this dis­
tinction, the author emphasizes that he does not wish to im­
ply that social evolution became independent of the size and 
density of the population (demography), and the natural en- 
vironment:
The iron laws of demography still clamped
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down on the spreading hominid populations, 
and the most spectacular cultural advances 
were impelled by the invention of new ways 
to control the environment (p.57*f)*
These are, in a summary, the main tenets of human so­
ciobiology - as expressed by Edward 0. V/ilson in his book 
oociobiology: The New Synthesis, Later on, as a response to 
several^ criticisms, the author elaborated on his positions, 
and added certain modifications. But this will be part of 
the discussion in a section presented later. Nov/ the focus 
shifts to V/ilson*s - and human sociobiology*si in general - 
critics.
NOTES
1. "Introduction: V/hat is Sociobiology", In Michael S. Gre­
gory’s Sociobiology and Human Nature. 1978 (pp.1-12).
2. The Use and Abuse of Biology. 1977
3. "The sum of an individual’s own fitness plus the sum of 
all the effects it causes to the related parts of the 
fitnesses of all its relatives" (V/ilson, 1975^:118).
k * "The Evolution of Reciprocal.Altruism", in Quarterly Re­
view of Biology. 1971, 46 (4-)’:35-57
3* Like depositing money in a bank or investing in shares in 
anticipation of increasing one's capital (one’s fitness 
in our*case). But V/ilson’s example of the drowning man 
and the rescuer, further on, seems senseless indeed. In 
reality, the rescuer risks one-tenth chance v/ith a chance 
of an unknown quality. It would make sense to say that he 
risks one-tenth, at present, for a possible gain of one- 
half, in the future, if he had a ten percent chance (or
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risk), to find himself in the place of the victim, some 
. time in the future. For example, if ten percent of the 
hum&n population were in a drowning situation some time 
during their life-time.
6. Natural selection is a premise of the old Darwinian evo- 
lutionaty theory, as well, but v/ith the distinction that 
the unit of selection is the individual organism instead 
of the kin.
7. The "superior adaptive value" is used, apparently, as a 
replacement of the "survival of the fittest" (see index 
- fitness - p.675)» in &n obvious attempt of avoiding 
identification v/ith Spencer. Note, as well, the idea of 
"behavior and social structure" viewed as "extensions of 
the genes", an idea on which the critics base their op­
position to V/ilson.
8. The Lamarckian theory "requires characters to be deve­
loped by use or disuse of the organs of individual or­
ganisms and then to be passed directly to the next gene­
ration, an impossibility when the organisms are sterile" 
(Wilson, 1975^:117)* David P. Barash in his Sociobiology 
and Behavior,(1977). presents a vivid example of the 
contrast between the Darwinian and Lamarckian theories 
of evolution. The author gives - on the Lamarckian side- 
the example of the "unsuccessful" technique used by Ly­
senko "to breed winter-resistant grain by exposing seed­
lings to cold, allowing them to mature and produce seed, 
then exposing the next generation of seedlings to cold 
again and so on" (Barash, 1977:29)* On the Darwinian 
side, the author gives the example of the successful 
plant breeders whereas "plants are exposed to cold, af­
ter which those individuals that show themselves to be 
most resistant are chosen (selected), and cross-fertili­
zed among themselves, producing the next generation (p. 
29).
In a summary, in the Lamarckian evolutionary the­
ory genes, or combinations of genes (in general, geno­
types), of all individual organisms are thought to have 
equal chance of surviving under certain environmental 
conditions once they are exposed to them for an adequate 
time period. The important variable is the equal ot>nor- • 
tunity given in order to acquire- characteristics fit for 
survival. In the Darwinian evolutionary theory, equal 
opportunity is of no consequence. Even if all genotypes 
are given equal opportunity to acquire characteristics 
fit for survival, only part of the. total number of geno­
types will be selected (survive and reproduce), because 
of their ingrained (genetic) differential ability for 
survival.
9. The conflict betv/een the Darwinian and the Lamarckian e-
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volutionary theories lies at the heart of the arguments 
against sociobiology (especially, as it will be shown 
later on, the arguments of the "Sociobiology Study 
Group of the Science for the People"). V/ilson takes, 
squarely, the Darwinian position (Wilson, 1975:*f, 63- 
64), and he regards natural selection as the "central 
dogma" of evolutionary biology: "The pervasive role of 
natural selection in shaping all classes of traits in 
organisms can be fairly called the central dogma of evo­
lutionary biology" (pp.21-22). And since sociobiology is 
a sub-discipline of evolutionary biology (p.4), natural 
selection becomes the "central dogma" of sociobiology, 
as well.
10. If natural selection is examined at the level of the 
group, it is only plain logic for the adaptive (fittest) 
gene to be examined as a group gene. The genes of the 
individual organism contribute only in part to the sur­
vival, or the fitness of the group (so, they are only 
partly adaptive). The example of the sterile organism 
(Wilson, 1975:117), will suffice: The sterile organism, 
as an individual, it is not fit to exist since it lacks 
the most important characteristic (alongside survival), 
of determining fitness, i.e. reproduction ability. It is 
(the organism) produced and it reproduces as part of the 
group. The concept of kin selection may be help the sur­
vival of the Darwinian theory, but it is against the so- 
ciobiological theory.
11. This will result, according to Wilson, in the explanation 
of stress, cognition, learning etc. He writes: "Stress 
will be evaluated in terms of the neurophysiological per­
turbations and their relaxation times. Cognition will be 
translated into circuity. Learning and creativeness will 
be defined as the alteration of specific portions of the 
cognitive machinery regulated by input from the emotive 
centers (Wilson, 1975^:575)•
12. No useful purpose is served in delving in these concepts 
here, since they do not have any bearing in this discus­
sion, or in any of the criticisms v/ith regard to socio­
biology.
13. This "attempt" is undertaken, as it is mentioned earlier, 
within the neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory enriched by 
the concepts of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, as 
well as of natural selection.
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THE CRITICS OF HUMAN SOCIOBIOLOGY
V/ilson* s Sociobiology: The' New Synthesis has not **oc­
casioned a crisis of connaissance and conscience". as Sah­
lins says (1977:x), as a result of dealing with sociobiology 
in general, which"consists mostly of zoology. About 90 per­
cent of its current material concerns animals11 (Gregory, 
1978:2) • V/ilson *s expertise in population biology and in­
vertebrate zoology has been praised by both proponents and
p
critics . The "crisis" arose out of the human sociobiolo­
gy in the last section of V/ilson* s book which "culminates in 
a discussion of humanity as the most developed of the social 
species*' (Caplan, 1978:277) ^ •
In a letter sent to Gerald Holton, as a response to 
a draft version of his paper "The New Synthesis" (Gregory, 
1978:75-97)* Alexander Morin, of the National Science Foun­
dation suggests three reasons for "the crisis of connais- • 
sance and conscience occasioned by sociobiology" (or what 
Morin calls "gut reaction." against sociobiology). These rea-
20
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sons, according to Morin, are the following:
•
First, sociobiology denies two essential e- 
leraents of the Greco-Judaic tradition: 
mind-body dualism and the special creation
of man.......................... ...........
Second, sociobiology violates Durkheim's 
injunction - which is bedrock in the train­
ing of social scientists in this country - 
that social phenomena can only be explained 
in terras of social variables...............
Third, sociobiology has implications (and 
may ultimately provide conclusions) that 
contradict the notion of the perfectibility 
of man, which is a fundamental assumption 
in the dominant political ideology of.sci­
ence as it has developed in the V/est (Gre­
gory, 1978:82).
V/ith such ramifications, it was only natural for so­
ciobiology to stimulate criticisms from a wide range of cir-
I
cles (biology, social sciences, philosophy). Below, repre­
sentative criticisms from thse disciplines will be presen­
ted:
Critics VJithin the Biological Discipline:
• C. H. V/addington * , as it is mention elsewhere,
praises Wilson's work with regard to its relevance in the
of
explanation of the social behavior/animals "from the most 
primitive types such as corals, through insects, fishes, 
>birds, to the many varieties of mammals and primitive man" 
(Caplan, 1978:25^)* But when the discussion is turned to 
the modern man, V/addington expresses strong reservations
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about the relevance of sociobiology. He disagrees with Wil­
son that the "central" theoretical problem in.sociobiology 
is altruism. This problem, he says, was raised, and the es­
sential solution of it provided, "more than forty years a- 
go" (p.25*f) ^ • What is seen by V/addington as the central 
problem facing sociobiology is "the whole topic of communi­
cation among individuals and all the many forms in which it
\
may be carried out" (p.257).
Two more features in sociobiology that are seen as 
"weak" by V/addington, are a) the reciprocal interaction be­
tween behavior and selection, and b) the absence of any
•
mention of mind, mentality, purpose, goal, aim, or "any 
word of similar connotation"in sociobiology. V/ith regard to 
to the "reciprocal interaction between behavior and sele­
ction", V/addington states:-
, To a major extent, animals lose out in se­
lection, not so much for doing the wrong 
thing, but for their inefficiency in per­
forming whatever it is they are doing. The 
nature of the selection is to a very large 
degree dictated by the nature of their be­
havior (Caplan, 1978:257).
The question of mentality is regarded by the author 
as "the weakest feature in the whole grand structure which 
Wilson has built up" (p.257). And he concludes:
I think one is bound to come to the con-
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elusion that the sociobiologists are just 
*running scared* of ferocious philoso­
phers* A fev; years ago it may have been 
tactically wise for quiet behavioral sci­
entists to practice their own distraction 
procedures against the threat of predato­
ry positivists, but I doubt if there is 
any longer any need for such super-caution
(p.238).
George Wald ^ is another biologist who wants the pro 
. cess of communicating and interacting between humans to be 
emphasized. He sees the genes as “only permissive1* and he 
identifies as “limiting factors'* the social, economic, and 
t political climate which imposes specialized roles in more 
and more urbanized, mechanized, and industrialized socie­
ties:
The genes are only permissive. Vie exploit 
our genetic potentialities less and less 
as we assume more and more specialized ro­
les in more and more urbanized, and indus­
trialized societies. The limiting factors 
in modern human performance are primarily 
social, economic,and political, (Gregory,
> 1978:277).
V/ald accepts the premise that man has “an animal he­
ritage of behavior", but he says that "by now large portions 
of it have become inappropriate to civilized life" (p,277).
An additional exmple of the opposition to V/ilson* s 
sociobiology was a letter published in The New York Review 
of Books (November 13, 1975:182, l8/f-186) 7 , titled »A- 
gainst *Sociobioly*", and signed by Elizabeth Allen et al.
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(the "al." represents 15 co-signers who were, in general,
professors of biology, psychology, anthropology and corapa-*
8rative zoology at Harvard University) . I n  this letter, 
the authors see V/ilson1s book as “the latest attempt to re- 
invigorate" Herbert Spencer1s “survival of the fittest” 
which proclaims “the primacy of natural selection in deter­
mining most important characteristics of human behavior” 
(Caplan, 1978:259)* The authors see this as resulting to a 
"deterministic view of human societies and human action” 
and associate it with eugenecists "such as Davenport” who ■ 
suggested that "deviant" behavior - criminality, alcoholism, 
etc. - are genetically based, as well as with the “more re­
cent claims for a genetic basis of racial differences in
*
intelligence by Arthur Jensen, V/illiam Shockley and others"
(pp.259-260)•
v
Allen et al. write that the reason for the survival 
of these "recurrent” deterministic theories is that they 
"consistently" tend to provide a "genetic justification of 
the status quo and of existing privileges for certain groups 
according to class, race or sex" (p.260). As examples of 
this, the authors give John D. Rockefeller*s Sr. saying that 
"the growth of large business is merely a survival of the 
fittest....It is merely the working out of a law of nature 
and a law of God", and the "eugenics policies which led to 
the establishment of gas chambers in Nazi Germany" (p.260).
In a later date, the same group (which by now its mem-
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bership increased from 16 to 35) published in BioScience 
(March, 1976), an article titled “.Another Biological Deter- 
minism", in which they continue their criticisms of socio­
biology mostly on the same lines. They say for exmple that 
the "outlines of human nature are viewed myopically, through 
the lens of modern Euro-American culture" (Caplan, 1978:
282) ^ # 23Ut this time, the authors deal more v/ith the sub- 
. stance of V/ilson1 s postulates and assumptions;
One of the important points they make is the distin­
ction between analogy and homology, pointing out that V/il­
son* s comparisons of the Homo sapiens with other animals - 
v/ith regard to "universal features of behavior" - are based 
on analogy (v/ith natural selection operating on different 
genes of different species and resulting to the production 
of convergent responses as independent adaptations to simi­
lar environments - Caplan, 1978:28/f). The authors are ready 
to accept only homology (evolved responses with identical 
functions - like the "eyes of vertebrates and octopuses"). 
V/ilson, they say, "fails" in this area:
Here V/ilson fails badly, for his favorite 
analogies arise by a twisted process of 
imposing human institutions on animals by 
metaphor, and then rederiving the human 
institutions as special cases of the more 
general phenomenon ‘discovered* in nature.
In this way human institutions suddenly 
become ‘natural* and can be viewed as a 
product of evolution (p.28/f).
Another interesting point made by the Sociobiology
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Study Group of Science for the People, is that sociobiolo­
gists see "the individual as the basic elements of determi-
to
nation and behavior, whereas society is simply the sum of 
all the individuals in it" (p.289)• And they proceed to pre­
sent their own viewpoint:
But this confuses cause and effect. Socie­
ties evolve because social and economic 
activity alter the physical and social 
conditions in which these activities oc­
cur. Unique historical events, actions of 
some individuals, and the altering of con­
sciousness of masses of people interact 
with social and economic forces to influ­
ence the timing, form, and even the possi­
bility of particular changes; individuals 
are not totally autonomous units whose in­
dividual qualities determine the direction 
of social evolution (p.289).
Critics Within the Social Sciences:
Marshal Sahlins distinguishes between the "vulgar 
sociobiology and the scientific sociobiology". The vulgar 
sociobiology is seen by the author "not so much the work of 
V/ilson", but more "as a premise taken up by the New Synthe­
sis from certain recent predecessors" n  . And he regards 
it as postulating that
human social phenomena are the direct ex­
pression of human behavioral dispositions 
or emotions, such as aggressiveness, se­
xuality, or altruism, the dispositions 
themselves having been laid down in the 
course of mammalian, primate, or horainid 
phylogeny (Sahlins, 1977:2±v;.
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The ’’scientific” sociobiology is viewed by Sahlins as 
based on ”kin selection1’, and as a
particularly salient form of the idea that 
human social behavior is determined b y a 
calculus of individual reproductive suc­
cess; that is, that all kinds of sociabi­
lity can be explained by the evolutionary 
tendency of the genetic material to maxi­
mize itself over time (Sahlins, 1977:xiv).
But although the author makes this original distin­
ction between ’’vulgar” and ’’scientific” sociobiology, he pro­
ceeds to explain that the work of V/ilson (as well as the 
works of R.L. Trivers, W.D. Hamilton, R. Alexander, - and M. 
V/est-Eberhard), are regarded by him as scientific in the 
sense that ”it would take more effort” to recognize in them 
’’the thesis of vulgar sociobiology” (p.*f). He says that the 
premise of ’’vulgar” sociobiology that ’’there is a one-to-one
V.
parallel between the character of human biological propensi­
ties and the properties of human social systems”, is ’’impli­
citly, explicitly, and extensively adopted by V/ilson and his 
coworkers” (p.5). And he supports his position as follows:
12Sociobiology opens with a discussion of 
the critical relevance of the hypothalamic 
and limbic centers of the human brain, as 
evolved by natural selection, to the for­
mulation of any ethical or moral philosophy*
These centers are said to 'flood our cons­
ciousness v/ith emotions' and to ’orchestrate 
our behavioral responses* in such.a way as 
to maximally proliferate the responsible 
genes. But most generally the thesis of the 
vulgar sociobiology is built into the scien-
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tific sociobiologist's idea of social or­
ganization (p.5).
V/ith regard to social organization, Sahlins says that 
sociobiology looks at the Durkheimian notion of the indepen­
dent existence and persistence of the social fact as a 
"lapse into mysticism", and it postulates that
Social organization is rather, and nothing 
more than, the behavioral outcome of the 
interaction of organisms having biological' 
ly fixed inclinations (p.5).
From his anthropological view ^  , the author sees 
culture as being "biology plus the symbolic faculty" (p.63)? 
and that a "theory of meaning" is needed to explain culture 
and not biology. He sees biology, or any other "law of na­
ture" (physical and chemical laws) as relating to the "fact 
of culture",
only as a limit does to a form, a constant 
to a difference, and a matrix to a practice. 
It will never be possible to explain the 
cultural properties of any such fact by re­
ferring it to underlying contents af a dif­
ferent order (pp.65-66).
11,
Along similar lines Eire Lawrence G. Miller's ^ eirgu- 
ments against sociobiology: Miller, examines sociobiology as 
a "recurrence of Spencerian evolutionary positivism" (Cap- 
lan, 1978:273)? and he sees it as a "sociopolitical state­
ment" which "must be seen as one aspect of the contemporary
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search for a biological basis for human behavior” (p*277). 
Sociobiology is. compared by the author to other "determini- 
stic" theories, "such as those focusing on I.Q. and the XYY 
genotype" (p.277).
According to Miller, evolutionary positivism (of 
which sociobiology is seesn as a manifestation),
purports to establish *human nature,1 a con­
cept which is inherently ideological in the 
sense that it establishes a certain model of 
humanity as esential and thus ’natural'. It 
may serve to ’explain* crime or aggression, 
justify competition, or pronounce impossible 
sharing and collective action. Equally im­
portant, attention may be deflected from so­
cial and political considerations which are 
tractable, unlike a genetically based human 
nature. Ultimately, the persistence of evo­
lutionary positivism can be traced to its 
ideological role in legitimating a concep­
tion of social order, be it Spencer's lais­
sez-faire utilitarianism or V/ilson*s techno­
logical social engineering (p.278).
In a further elaboration of the comparison between 
Wilson and Spencer, Miller writes that "just as Spencer 
soeght a 'true theory of humanity'", so V/ilson, "in modern 
jargon, is searching for the human 'biogram* ** (p.275) > which 
he detailed as follows:
Both reject the notion of an immutable hu­
man essence. Spencer asserted the indefi­
nite flexibility of humans, while Wilson is 
more circumspect; his human nature includes 
aggression, allegiance, love, sexual drives, 
and xenophobia. Both point out that human 
nature is subject to evolutionary pressure^
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especially with respect to the development 
of altruism. And both begin v/ith similar 
premises: human nature is essentially in­
dividualist, so only natural selection can 
foster altruism (p.275)*
Miller, in general, sees sociobiology as based on 
"presuppositions”, and V/ilson*s arguments as involving the 
"juxtaposition of common sense and scientific justification"
i
. (p.276). In order to support his conclusion, the author pre­
sents the following quotation from V/ilson* s sociobiology. a 
quotation which, according to Miller, "explains the behavior 
of children in popular twentieth-century fashion" (p.276):
It should be of selective advantage for 
young children to be self-centered and re­
latively disinclined to perform altruistic 
acts based on personal principle. Similar­
ly, adolescents should be more tightly 
bound by age-peer bonds within their own 
sex and hence unusually sensitive to peer 
approval. The reason is that at this time 
greater advantage accrues to the formula­
tion of alliances and rise in status than 
later (pp.276-277).
Critics Within Philosophy:
1 6Marjorie Grene addresses the "methodological prob­
lems of providing biological explanations for mental pheno­
mena" (Gregory, 1978:216). The author sees six methodologi­
cal obstacles to explaining mind "in the sense proposed 
through reference to evolution in terms of relative fitness"
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(p.216). These "obstacles", as the author states, are: 1)
The theoretical ground of sociobiology (evolutionary biolo­
gy through natural selection), "entails" an explanation of 
cognitive claims that makes its own cognitive claims "impos­
sible" in the form in which it makes them (p.216). The au­
thor explains:
For if they carry through their own theory 
sociobiologists should recognize that their 
Arguments,1 which, like all behavior, are 
the effects of evolution in terms of rela­
tive fitness, are founded not on reasons for 
holding that their statements are credible 
but on a tendency toward maximization of re­
productive effeciency on the part of some of 
their genes. But the same holds for their 
critics1 statements. So there is no argument, 
only the universal war of gene against gene, 
(Gregory, 1978:216).
The author sees, in essence, th!e sociobiological ar­
guments - or any other arguments - as tested on universally 
accepted "cognitive claims". Sociobiology sees them as test­
ed on the genes of the individual. But "this kind of theo­
ry", according to Grene, is "epistemologically self-defeat­
ing" (p.216), The second point made by Grene is that socio­
biology is an "antiquated science" based on Newton*s laws 
of causal reasoning. And she rejects this kind of-reasoning:
Rational causal explanation does not fol­
low simply from regularity, nor do state­
ments about some of the phenomena lead us 
with necessity to statements about all of 
them. Moreover, in addition to its naive 
acceptance of regularity as yielding exp­
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lanation, Newton,s naive atomism, too is 
retained in sociobiological thinking:
Genes replace hard, solid, impenetrable 
particles as ultimate units (p*21?).
The third point made by Grene is that Wilson "assumes” 
the "absorption of the human into the natural world" (p*217). 
This, according to Grene, is attempted by sociobiology by 
"the reduction of all standards, purposes, or duties - all 
to which we owe allegiance - to the blind bombardment of par­
ticles by one another" (p.218).
Fourth, sociobiology - by purporting to answer philo­
sophical questions about mind by specifying necessary biolo­
gical conditions for its evolution - confuses "necessary" 
with "sufficient" conditions (p.219)*vGrene, states that to 
"discover the biological conditions for mental development 
is not to say how, within those conditions, mind works (p.
219).
i
Fifth, the study of the brain entails "much more" than 
the concepts permitted by evolutionary theory* The author 
writes: "evolutionary explanation provides necessary condi­
tions for the existence of a phenomenon, not an understanding 
of the phenomenon itself" (p*220)•
The final (sixth), point - or obstacle - which the au­
thor calls the "gravest error" of a sociobiological approach, 
is the "failure" of sociobiologists to understand "the nature
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of artifactual symbol systems and of human beings as animals 
dependent for theirpeculiar life-style on the existence of 
such systems; One could say, for short, its failure to under­
stand the way in which mind is an expression of culture" (p. 
220).
In concluding, Grene states that mind - with its ca­
pacity to acquire the ability to enter into symbol-consti­
tuting and symbol-constituted activities - is "irreducible 
to its biological and in particular to its ganetic condi­
tions" (p.22Zf).
Another philosopher, Anthony Quinton "agrees" with 
the "anti-naturalists" that there can be no well-founded e- 
volutionary ethics as traditionally understood and that,
the evolving and naturally selected human 
characteristics which are principally re­
levant to ethics and social policy are so­
cially acquired and not genetically inhe- . 
rited (Caplan, 1978:137).
Quinton states that, "on the whole" it seems reason­
able enough to suppose that the internal details of indivi-
i
dual moral capacity are acquired by a process of social evo­
lution, and so are amenable to the type of explanation of­
fered by Freud*s super-ego theory, but that if the broad in­
stinctive substructure of men has evolved at all within the 
life-span of the species and is not part of the initial ge­
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geneticall" (p. 138)*
Teilhard De Chardin:
Relevant to the present discussion, although not a 
reaction to sociobiological postulates, are the writings of 
Teilhard De'Chardin ^  . The French naturalist ^  philoso­
pher accepts Darwin1s evolutionary theory, but he sees the 
English scientist - and his adherents, the materialists - 
as well as their counterparts, the “upholders of a spiritu­
al interpretation",• as "fighting" on "different planes"* And 
he suggests that the two points of view should be "brought 
into union",
I
in a kind of phenomenology or generalised 
physic in which the internal aspect of 
things as well as the external aspects of 
the world will be taken into account 
(Chardin, 1965:53).
Chardin, in leading the way towards such a unity, be­
gins by defining matter as consisting of three faces: Plura­
lity, Unity and Energy (p*40), with energy being at the be­
ginning and at the end of evolution* But his idea of energy 
deviates from the definition of energy by the physicist. 
Chardin does not see enrgy only as a "unifying power" but as 
the "expression of structure" as well. This prompts him to 
describe energy as:
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that floating, universal entity from v/hich 
all emerges and into v/hich all falls back 
as into an ocean; energy, the new.spirit; 
the new god. So, at the world's Omega, as 
at its Alpha, lies the Impersonal (Chardin, 
1965:258).
i
For Chardin, energy is synonymous to mind, soul, spi- 
rit or consciousness. In defining energy as consciousness he 
writes:
The initial quantum of consciousness con­
tained in our terrestrial world is not 
formed merely of an aggregate of parti­
cles caught fortuitously in the same net. 
It represents a correlated mass of infi­
nitesimal centres structurally bound to­
gether by the conditions of their origin 
and development (pp. 73-7k ).
This energy (or intelligence, spirit,, consciousness), 
evolves through "the natural phenomena of the 'change of 
state'" (p.169), and through "a psychical kindling or con­
centration" (p.169), from intelligence to the atom, from the 
atom to the cell and from the cell to the thinking animal. 
The highest form of thinking animal is the human (p.170), 
and its evolution terminates in the noosphere, after which 
involution begins. In summarizing his explanation of the 
above evolutionary steps the author writes:
\
we have been following the successive steps 
of the same grand progression from the fluid 
contours of the early earth. Beneath the 
pulsations of geo-chemistry, of geo-techto- . 
nics and of geo-biology, we have detected one
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and the same fundamental process, always 
recognisable - the one which was given 
material form in the first cells and was 
continued in the construction of ijervous 
systems. V/e saw geogenesis promoted to 
biogenesis, which turned out in the end 
to be nothing else than psychogenesis
(p.181).
Psychogenesis, the author continues, "has led" to 
man. Specifically, with regard to the evolution of humans, 
* Chardin writes:
The more we find of fossil human remains 
and the better v/e understand their ana­
tomic features and their succession in 
geological time, the more evident it be- 
* comes, by an unceasing convergence of all 
signs and proofs, that the human fspecies1, 
however unique the ontological position 
that reflection gave it, did not, at the 
moment of its advent, make any sweeping 
change in nature. Whether we consider the 
species in its environment, in the mor­
phology of its stem, or in the global 
structure of its group, v/e see it emerge 
phyletically exactly like any other species
tp.18i).
.'But all this changes, according to Chardin, with the 
"awakening of thought" (p.181). The awakening of thought 
gives rise to the "noosphere" (p.180-18/*), which sets man 
apart from other animals and towards the ultimate of concep-
1Q
tions: Omega point 7 .
Chardin goes further and compares what he calls Ome 
ga point with the Christian god. Hewrites:.
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In one manner or the other it still remains 
true that, even in the view of hte mere bi­
ologist, the human epic resembles nothing 
so much as a way of the Cross (p.313)*
\
This,of course, does not cast the author with the side 
of the theological explanation of the human nature. And such 
an affiliation does not arise from his explanation of the 
human evolution. But Chardin does not conclude his discussion 
here. He proceeds further to claim the lrprimacy of the spi­
rit” (p.309)* He suggests that at the "origin” of life the 
focus of "arangement", in each individual element, "engen­
ders” and "controls” its related "focus of consciousness”. 
But, higher up, the "equilibrium is reversed". The focus of 
consciousness, or intelligence, begins to "take charge". And 
still higher, (at the approaches of "collective reflection"), 
the focus of consciousness is "breaking away from its tempo- 
ro-spatial frame to Join with the supreme and universal fo­
cus Omega" (p.309)*
NOTES
1. Edward 0. V/ilson, introducing the book sociobiolor;y and 
human nature, edited by Michael S. Gregory, Anita Silvers 
and Diane Sutch, and published by Jossey-Bass, San Eran-
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cisco, U.S.A., 1978
2„. Among others, Waddington writes: This book will undoub- 
tetly be for many years to come a major source of infor­
mation about all aspects of our knowledge of social be­
havior in animals, from the most primitive types such as 
corals, through insects, fishes, birds, to the many va­
rieties of mammals and primitive man. It has also some 
of the clearest discussions yet written of recent advan­
ces in general population biology and demography. Many 
large drawings illustrate the major aspects of social t' 
behavior in various groups of animals with exemplary 
clarity. (Caplan, 1973:2540.
In addition to Waddington, Michael Ruse, in the in­
troduction to his book Sociobiology: Sense or nonsense? 
describes Wilson as a ’‘distinguish Harvard entomologist" 
who presented in the Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.
"the most thorough and inclusive treatment possible, be­
ginning in the animal world with the ost simple forms, 
and progressing via insects, lower invertebrates, mam­
mals and primates, right up to and including our own spe­
cies, Homo sapiens" (Ruse, 1979:1).
3. Quoted from Lawrence G. Miller's article "Fated Genes", 
first published in the Journal of the History of the Be­
havioral Sciences (April, 1976, pp.183-190). The quota­
tions used here were taken from the book The Sociobiolo­
gy Debate (edited by Arthur L. Caplan), where the arti­
cle was reprinted (pp. 269.-279) •
4-. Waddington is a biologist, noted especially for his book 
The Strategy of the Genes: A Discussion of Some Aspects 
of Theoretical Biology. George Allen and Unwin, London, 
-England, 1937* Here the reference is to Waddington1s ar­
ticle "Mindless Societies", first published in the Hew 
York Review of Books (August 7, 1975), and reprinted in 
Caplan's The Sociobiology Debate. 1978 (pp. 252-258).
5* V/addington, as he says, is referring to J.3.S. Haldane's 
book The Causes of Evolution, published in 1932* Among 
others, Haldane writes: "Insofar as it makes for the 
survival of one's descendants and near relations, altrui­
stic behavior is a kind of Darwinian fitness, and may be 
expected to spread as a result of natural selection" (P. 
131). Cited in Caplan (1978:254-).
6. "The Human Condition", Sociobiology and Human Nature.
1978
7. Cited in Arthur L. Caplan's The Sociobiology Debate, Har­
per & Row, New York, U.S.A., 1978 (pp.259-264)•
8. The group of these academicians is otherwise known as The
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Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, and 
they published another article in BioScience (March,
1976, 26, No.3), to which reference will be forthcoming*
9. The authors base this opinion on the following characte­
ristics of human nature"^ as presented in Wilson's socio­
biology; l) Territoriality and tribalism, 2) Inaoctrina- 
bility, 3) Spite and Family chauvinism, 4) Reciprocal 
altruism, 5) Blind faith, 6) Warfare (Caplan, 1978:282)*
10. The Use and Abuse of Biolog?/'. 1977
11. The "predecessors" are cited as Ardrey, Lorenz, Morris, 
Tiger and Fox (Sahlins, 1977:*f) •
12. HereSahlins means Wilson's book sociobiology: The New 
Synthesis (1975a).
13. Sahlins»s book is subtitled: An Anthropological Critique 
of Sociobiology.
1 if. First published in the Journal of the History of the Be­
havioral Sciences (April 1976:183-190). The quotations 
used here are taken from the book The Sociobiology De­
bate (edited by Arthur L. Caplan), where the article was 
reprinted (pp.2 6 9 - 2 7 9 ).
13. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 1970
16. "Ethics and the Theory of Evolution", in Caplan's The So­
ciobiology Debate. 1978 (pp. 117 - W  ) •
17. The Phenomenon of Man. 1963
18. He regards himself as naturalist (Chardin, 1963:39)*
19* The Omega point is defined as the "point" at an intelli­
gently "higher order" where the "convergent beams of 
millions of elementary centres dispersed over the surface 
of -the thinking earth" (Chardin, 1965:259)*
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WILSON'S RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS 
AND OTHER COMPATIBLE VIEtfS
As a response to several criticisms.Edward O, Wilson 
stepped forward to make certain clarifications, expositions 
and - sometimes - modifications of his earlier positions.
One such occasion was his letter published in The New York 
Review of Books which was an answer to the "false state­
ments and accusations that comprise the letter signed by E- 
lizabeth Allen and 15 co-signers in the November 13 New York 
Review of Books" ( Caplan, 1978:265) ^ • Among the points he 
makes are the following:
1. The claim that Sociobiology: The New Syn- 
thesis is an attempt to "reinvigorate the­
ories" which in the past, through "euge­
nics policies" led to the establishment of 
"gas chambers in Nazi Germany," is an "ug­
ly, irresponsible, and totally false accu­
sation" (Caplan, 1978:265)*
2. Comparisons, in literal terras, between the 
behavior of other organisms and humans 
should be avoided. In this case, "slave- 
making" in ants can not offer to huraans 
"any moral or political lesson" (p.266).
3. Wilson's sociobiology is "far closer" to
40
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Dobzhansky's statement that “In a sense 
human genes have surrendered their pri­
macy in human evolution to an entirely 
ew non-biological or superorganic agent, 
culture”, than to “the opposite position” 
(p.266).
if* The “pivotal indictment” by Allen et al. 
that “Wilson joins the long parade of 
biological determinists” is false (here 
the author cites his article in the New 
York Times Magazine - October 12, 1975 - 
Y/here he suggests that in sociobiology 
there is the trap of “the naturalistic 
fallacy of ethics, which uncritically 
concludes that what is, should be* The 
■what is' in human nature is to a large 
extent the heritage of a Pleistocene 
hunter-gatherer existence”. And later 
on: “genetic biases can be trespassed, 
passions averted or redirected, and e~ 
thics altered"), (p.267)*
5. The mind is not “infinitely malleable"* 
“Human sociobiology should be pursued 
and its findings weighed as the best 
means we have of tracing the evolutio­
nary history of the mind. In the dif­
ficult journy ahead, during which our 
ultimate guide must be our deepest and, 
at present, least understood feelings, 
surely v/e cannot afford an ignorance of 
history” (p.267).
3
In another occassion , V/ilson redefines redefines 
sociobiology and emphasizes more the human study in the di­
scipline :
Sociobiology is defined as the systematic 
study of the biological basis of all forms 
of social behavior, including sexual and 
parental behavior, in all kinds of orga­
nisms, including humans (Gregory, 1978:2).
And he continues:
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Sociobiology consists mostly of zoology. 
About 90 percent of its current material 
concerns animals, even though over 90 
percent of the attention given to socio­
biology by nonscientists, and especially 
journalists, is due to its possible ap­
plications to the study of human social 
behavior (p.2).
In an apparent response to the several objections of 
the application of sociobiology to the study of humans, Wil­
son writes the following:
There is nothing unusual about deriving 
principles and methods, and even termi­
nology, from intensive examinations of 
lower organisms and applying them to the 
study of human beings. Most of the funda­
mental principles of genetics and bioche­
mistry applied to human biology are based 
on colon bacteria, fruit flies, and white 
rats* To say that the same science can be 
applied to human beings is not to reduce 
humanity to the status of these simpler 
creatures (pp.2-3).
The author proceeds by dealing with what he calls 
"the strongest redoubt of counterbiology": Mentalism. He 
notes the following:
< It is difficult - for some it is impos­
sible to envision the existence of the 
mind and the creation of symbolic thought 
by biological processes. 'The human mind,' 
this argument often goes, 'is an emergent 
property of the brain that is no longer, 
tied to genetic controls. All that the genes 
can prescribe is the construction of the 
liberated brain' (p.9).
Y/ilson disagrees with this position:
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But the relation between genes, the brain 
and the mind is only a practical difficul­
ty, not a theoretical one. Models have al­
ready been produced in neurobiology and 
cognitive psychology that allow at least 
the possibility of mind as an epiphenome- 
non of complex but essentially conventio­
nal neuronal circuity. Consciousness might 
well consist of large numbers of coded 
abstractions, some fed stepwise through a 
hierarchy of integrating centers whose 
lowest array consists of the primary sense 
cells, others originating internally to si­
mulate these hierarchies (p.9).
In further discussion, the author sees the mind as a 
possible "republic of alternative schemata," which are prog­
rammed to compete for control of the decision centers, "in­
dividually waxing and waning in power according to the rela­
tive urgency of the needs of the body" (p.9). And he conti­
nues to make "his" point:
My point is that it is entirely possible 
for all known components of the mind, in- 
. eluding will, to have a neurophysiologi- 
cal basis subject to genetic evolution by 
natural selection. There is no a -priori 
reason why any portion of the foundation 
of human social behavior must be excluded 
from the domain of sociobiological analy­
sis (p.10).
Finally, responding to the "remarkably harsh" response
of the Science for the People Group ^ , V/ilson writes that
these criticisms are "an example of what Kans Kung (1976) has
called the fury of the theologians" (p.2). Wilson sees the
application of evolutionary theory to social systems as "an 
extension of the great Western tradition of scientific mate-
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rialisra" (Gregory, 1978:2), And, as such, “it threatens to 
transform into testable h5rpothese& the assumptions about hu­
man nature made by some Marxist philosophers” (p.2),
David P. Barash:
David P. Barash ^ is one of the defenders of sociobi­
ology, for which he attempted to build a case. Specifically, 
in responding to criticisms that sociobiology is racist, he
writes:
/
Concern has been expressed that human so­
ciobiology represents racism in disguise: 
This is simply not true. Sociobiology deals 
with biological universals that may under­
lie human social behavior, universals that 
are presumed to hold cross-culturally and 
therefore cross-racially as well. What bet­
ter antidote for racism than such emphasis 
on the behavioral commonality of our single 
species (Barash, 1977:278)?
The author states that when there is supporting evi­
dence that human behavior has biological foundations, this 
does not mean "condoning" the behavior in question:
V
Sociobiology searches for the biological 
foundations of social behavior. When eva­
luations of this sort are made for human 
behaviors and supporting evidence is pre­
sented, this may be misread as somehow 
condoning the behaviors in question. Again, 
this is nonsense: Ethical judgements have 
no place in the study of human sociobiology 
or in any other science for that matter.
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V/hat is biological is not necessarily 
good, assuming here that human social 
behavior is in fact found to have a 
valid evolutionary substrate. Diseases 
are part of our biology; this does not 
imply that they are good. V/e study pneu­
mococci, seeking further understanding 
of hov/ they are put together and why they 
do v/hat they do; this does not imply 
that we approve of pneumonia (pp.278-279)•
Barash continues by saying that Homo sapiens is a 
* J’di'fficult creature*' and the social sciences, in studying 
their subject matter, need "all the help they can get":
The task of unraveling such a difficult 
creature as Homo sapiens is so awsome that 
the social sciences need all the help they 
can get. They should leave no stone un­
turned, no tool unused in pursuit of any­
thing that might offer further insight; 
and, considering the explanatory and pre­
dictive power of evolutionary theory when 
applied to the social behavior of other 
living things, application of this evolu­
tionary approach"to human behavior seems 
eminently sensible. If biology seems arro­
gant in seeking to include humans within 
its scope, think of the greater arrogance 
of a social science that refuses help v/hen 
it is offered (pp.276-277)*
J
' With regard to substantive areas of sociobiology, the 
author deals, among others, with "one of the oldest and least 
productive debates in the history of science", namely, the 
debate concerned with the "underlying causes of behavior", 
and manifested in the conflict which "has been variously des­
cribed as instinct versus learning, nature versus nurture, or 
endogenous versus exogenous control of behavior" (p.39). Bio-
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logists, "particularly ethologists**, according to Barash, 
and social scientists, "particularly psychologists", engaged 
in rather "acrimonious" debate , "with the biologists favor­
ing genetic influences and the social scientists emphasizing 
the role of learning, culture, and other environmental modi­
fiers of behavior** (p.39)* The debate of nature versus nur­
ture or instinct versus learning, is seen by the author as 
■ culminating into a ‘'compromise synthesis", because - as the 
author suggests - "like most dichotomies, the either-or que­
stion was essentially meaningless" (p.39)* According to this 
"comromise", as endorsed by Barash,
it makes no sense to consider an animal’s 
development and behavior in the absense of 
an environment; likewise, the extreme of 
environmentalists’ claims would posit an 
environment without any organism. In short, 
all phenotypes derive from the interaction 
of an organism's genetic potential with its 
environment, and behavior is as good a phe­
notype as any other,(p.39).
The concept of phenotype, introduced here by the au­
thor, occupies an important position in the sociobiological 
explanation of behavior. As earlier defined by him, an orga­
nism's phenotype "is any actual, directly observable chara­
cteristics of an organism - such things as size, color, or
shape and anything we can measure or count, from structure
6
to behavior" (Barash, 1977:13) •
The relative contributions of genotype (the organism’s
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genes or “genetic potential”), and environment may vary “con­
siderably", according to Barash, but neither*s contribution 
is ever “equal to zero11 (p.JfO). Proceeding from here, the au­
thor constructs a model in which he places the organisms ac- 
. cording to the differencial influence on their behavior of 
the genotypic and environmental factors. On the one extreme, 
with the highest influence of genotypic factors and the low­
est influence of environmental factors are the insects, fish, 
reptiles and birds (in that order)• At the other end, with 
the highest influence of the environmental factors and the 
lowest influence of the genotypic ones, are the human beings 
and the non-human mammals (p.ij-1).
By referring to artificial selection and hybridization 
studies among fruit flies (Hirsch, 1963* Manning, 1965)* mice 
dogs, cats, horses etc. (Barash, 1977:A5), the author con­
cludes that the evidence supporting the correlation between 
genes and behavior is “overwhelming" (p.A7)* And for those 
for whom this correlation “still appears perplexing", .Barash 
presents another - this time “mechanistic” - viewpoint:
the DNA of which genes are composed speci­
fies the production of prodeins, leading to 
the various structures constituting an or­
ganism. These structures include bone, muscle, 
gland, and nerve cells. Behavior unquestio­
nably arises as a consequence of the activity 
of nerve cells, which presumably are suscep­
tible to specification by DNA, just any other 
cells. Accordingly, insofar as genes specify 
the organization of nerve cells, just as they 
specify the organization of bone cells, there
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is every reason to accept a role of genes 
in producing behavior, just as we accept 
a role of genes in producing structure (p.
4-7) .
With regard to the derivation of answers concerning 
the correlation between behavior and genes in the human do­
main, the author points to the “serious problem" arising 
from the fact that “we cannot experimentally manipulate 
genes and vary environments at will among humans so as to 
isolate causative factors, as we can among non-humans“ (p. 
281)• And he concludes:
Therefore v/e must content ourselves with 
descriptions of what actually occurs in 
human behavior, often being unable to par­
cel these phenotypes to social experience 
or evolution (p.28l),
Pierre L. van den Berghe:
n
Pierre L. van den Berghe r is another defender of so­
ciobiology, although his position comes closer to the brid­
ging of the gap between genetic and environmental approaches 
in the determination of human social behavior. The author 
does not see sociobiology as the antithesis of the "cultu­
rally deterministic" position adopted by “many" social scien 
tists. He writes:
Sociobiology, be it noted, is not the anti-
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thesis of the culturally deterministic 
position just outlined. Sociobiologists 
are quite happy to recognize that .human 
species is unique in some important re­
spects. So, for that matter, is every 
species; otherwise it would not be a spe­
cies. Humans, in short, are not unique 
in being unique. Nor do sociobiologists 
deny the importance of human conscious­
ness and culture and the effect these 
have in greatly accelerating processes 
of human adaptation to and modification 
of the environment (Gregory, 1973:^1)•
Where sociobiologists differ, according to van den 
Berghe, is on the emphasis they place on biological evolution, 
. without which the human attributes are "incomprehensible".The 
author sees both "heredity and environment, nature and nur­
ture, the inborn and the learned" as being "only two faces of 
the same interactive reality" (p.Zf2).
Van den Berghe regards the place of social scientists
i
"as specialists in one species that happens to be uniquely 
dear to us" as safe and "assured". But he suggests:
If the social sciences are ever to achieve 
scientific status, however, they cannot 
continue to dangle in an evolutionary va­
cuum, isolated from the natural sciences
(p.*f2).
The author suggests, in responding to claims that so­
ciobiology is a defender of the status quo, that the new 
discipline is, in contrast to these accustations, a "challe­
nge for change":
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Socio'oiology predicts that we shall con­
tinue to reproduce, consume resources, and 
destroy each other with abandon because we 
are programmed to care only about ’ourselves 
and our relatives. So far, there is little 
evidence to show that sociobiology is 
wrong. The ultimate challenge of humanity 
is to prove sociobiology wrong, not by 
assertion but through self-conscious change 
in our behavior. Far from being an apology 
for the status quo, sociobiology is a chal­
lenge for change. The more v/e learn about 
the kind of animal we are, the more self- 
conscious our behavior will become; and the 
more self-conscious we are the more effec-. • 
tively v/e can change in the direction we 
choose (p.52).
NOTES
1. Published in the issue of December 11, 1975* Quotations 
used here are taken from Arthur C. Caplan’s The Sociobio­
logy Debate. 1978, v/here the letter was reprinted (pp. 
£65-268).
2. Excerpts from A.llen’s letter were cited earlier.
5- In the introduction to Gregory’s book Sociobiology and 
Human Nature, 1978 (pp. 1-12).
4-. The criticisms by Allen et Al., cited earlier, and other 
criticisms by Marxists.
5* Sociobiology and Behavior. 1977
6. Wilson defines phenotype as ’’the observable properties of 
an organism as they have developed under the combined in­
fluences of the genetic constitution of the individual 
and the effects of the environmental factors” (Wilson,
1975a:591).
7. ’’Bridging the Paradigms: Biology and the Social Sciences”, 
Sociobiology and Human Nature . edited by Michael S. Gre­
gory. Anita Silvers & Diane Sutch, and published by Jos- 
sey-Bass, San Francisco, U.S.A., 1978.
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tA SYNTHESIS
The dichotomy of innate versus acquired social beha­
vior (as it is presented in the views mentioned in the pre­
vious pages), is abandoned by Daniel G. Freedmanl who adopts 
a ’'monistic*' view of social behavior, suggesting
that we sire totally biological, totally 
environmental, that the two are as in­
separable as an object and its shadow.
Or, as Hebb (1959) put it, we are 100%
 ^ innate, 100% acquired; one might add,
100% biological," 100% cultural (Freed- , 
man, 1979:14-1).
Freedman wants the "obfuscating" term innate, as well 
as the terms instinctive, inborn, unlearned, which are "fun­
ctionally synonymous " to innate, to be avoided in "any se­
rious description of behavior", and be replaced by the terms 
evolved or uhylogenetically adaptive behavior. This "termi­
nological change", the author states, in addition to repla­
cing "obfuscating " terms, "will have the secondary advan­
tage of bringing evolution into the forefront of our think­
ing where it belongs" (p. 1 -^3) •
51
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The “genetic” and the “learned11 are seen as insepa­
rable by Freedman, who proceeds to adopt the pre-Christian 
2
Greek idea of the unity of body and mind:
v
There is no way to separate the genetic 
and the learned fo they are permanently 
glued together, and that is true every­
where in nature, including man* Logical­
ly, anything we do is gene related. If 
I think, it is my genetically derived 
brain that is thinking and not some dis­
embodied mind (p.lVf).
Freedman diagrees with the "many" Western scientists 
v/ho believe that “mind is nonbody“, and he sees “no merit“ 
in tearing “asunder" mind and body or culture and biology. 
And he concludes: :
Certainly, as you and I negotiate life, 
v/e do not have separate cultural and 
biological experiences, for experience 
is marvelously unitary. Curiously, it 
takes an added intellectual step for 
modern V/e stern man to return to" this 
simple view (p.1Zf4)*
. Freedman, here, regards the problem as a philosophi­
cal one. In this he agrees with Michael Ruse ^ : Citing 
Thomas Kulai ** , with regard to the philosophical* base of 
major scientific conflicts, Michael Ruse supports his in­
volvement in the sociobiology "controversy" (although a 
philosopher), by suggesting that "much of the sociobiolo­
gical controversy goes beyond science to matters philoso-
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phical" (Ruse, 1979:3)•
But,identifying the problem as a philosophical one 
does not put an end to the conflict between sociobiologists 
and social scientists* Marjorie Grene*s ^ wish that, ’*
this particular *new synthesis’ may soon
join the other interesting relics .....
that lie about the lumber room of our in­
tellectual history (p.22*f),
is not an answer to the debate. A careful examination of the 
positions and counterpositions in the debate is a more like­
ly route to its fruitful resolution:
Critics of sociobiology characterize it as "another 
biological determinism" • But the "signs",with regard to 
this point, that are coming from the direction of sociobio 
logy’s proponents are conflicting:
It is true that Wilson suggests that DNA determines 
the organism. This is obvious in the following quotation:
Samuel Butler’s famous aphorism, that the 
chicken is only an egg’s"way of making a- 
nother egg, has been modernized: the or­
ganism is only DNA’s way of making more 
DNA. More to the point, the hypothalamus 
and limbic system are engineered to perpe­
tuate DNA (Wilson, 1975a:5).
7It is true, as well, that Barash f compares the rela>
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tion between genes and nerve cells, as well as the relation 
between genes and bone cells, with their relation to beha­
vior:
insofar as genes specify the organization 
of nerve cells, just as they specify the 
organization of bone cells, there is every 
reason to accept a role of genes in pro­
ducing behavior, just as we accept a role 
of genes in producing structure (Barash,
1977:^7).
Q
But it is equally true, as Gregory notes, that "e- 
ven the staunchest sociobiologists do not argue for a one- 
to-one correlation between gene and behavior1* (Gregory, 1978 
286)* The author continues:
They recognize..*••.••••.that behavior is 
a transaction between the gene and the 
environment. In the literature of socio­
biology, behavior is often termed a •phe­
notype. and the maxim "Genotype plus en­
vironment equals phenotype" is generally 
accepted (p.286).
. Wilson and Barash are not exceptions to Gregory*s un-
q
derstanding of the sociobiologists. For example Wilson , 
in responding to criticisms by Allen et al. ^  that make him 
"appear to be the arch hereditarian", he says that he is 
"far closer" to Dobzhanky*s statement that *in a sense hu­
man genes have surrendered their primacy in human evolution 
to an entirely new non-biological or superorganic agent, 
culture,* than to the "opposite position" (Caplan, 1973:266)
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An almost identical view is expressed by V/ilson in another
i
instance:
Human behavior is dominated by culture in 
the sense that the greater part, perhaps 
all, of the variation between societies is 
based on differences in cultural experien­
ce (Barash,1978:xiv).
11
Barash , on the other hand, is more categorical in 
acknowledging the importance of environment in influencing 
behavior* In the following quotation he is satisfied with 
only ‘'larger than zero genetic influence” on behavior:
/
No behavior is produced by genotype acting 
alone, and,similarly, no behavior is pro­
duced by environment alone. The interaction 
principle legitimizes sociobiology in that 
it argues for a definite role of genes in 
mediating behavior, (of course, it also ar­
gues equally strongly for a finite role of 
environment, and this is not inconsistent. 
Sociobiology does not require genetic de­
terminism of behavior, only a genetic in­
fluence larger than zero). (Gregory,1978:24)*
1 2. Grene notices these conflicting “signs’* coming from 
V/ilson. The author writes:
V/ilson himself........seems to have moved
away (V/ilson, 1977) from the more confi­
dent (and more dogmatic) theses of his o- 
riginal urogram (V/ilson, 1975a) (Gregory,. 
1978:224).
V/hat is needed,therefore, in order to discredit (or
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credit, for that matter), sociobiology is not a reliance on 
the conflicting writings of its adherents, but an examina­
tions of the postulates on which these adherents claim to 
build their theoretical framework. Such an examination points, 
first of all, to the concept of natural selection.
Natural selection, according to Wilson ^  , is the 
* "central dogma” of evolutionary biology (of which sociobiolo­
gy is a branch). Natural selection is regarded as the “light 
and the way”. And based on this dogma, the author is “con­
vinced" that as all other biological phenomena which are "ex­
tensions" of those genes which exist (or v/e re selected), for 
their superior adaptive value (or fitness), behavior and so­
cial structure are such extensions, as v/ell (V/ilson, 1975a:
21- 22) .
V
/
/
And, if natural selection, the central dogma of socio­
biology, is not accepted, the debate over sociobiology be- 
comes futile. This is exactly what happens in the case of the 
arguments between creationists and evolutionists. No meaning­
ful discussion can take place between the believers in the 
devine creation of humans and Darwin's followers in the exp­
lanation of the descent of man. From the time the belief in 
the supernatural intervention in the operation of the natural 
laws interferes with the examination of the interrelation­
ships of these laws, the communication breaks down abruptly.
But by casting aside the creationists, the problems
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with regard to the acceptance or rejection of natural sele­
ction as proposed by Darwin and as used - as the "central 
dogma" - in evolutionary biology, in general, and in socio­
biology, in particular, is not resolved. The conflict be­
tween the Lamarckian ^  and the Darwinian ^  theories of 
evolution, is not resolved-as V/ilson believes (1975a: 117)* 
Wilson believes that the"inability" of the Lamarckian theo­
ry to account for the existence of sterile organisms proves 
to be "truly fatal" to it (p.117). By comparison, by the in­
troduction by Darwin of the idea of natural selection ope­
rating at the level of the family (the group) the latter*s 
theory was saved (p.117)* But this need not be so: Gene mu­
tations can very well account for the existence of sterile, 
organisms, thus "saving" Lamarck’s theory, as well.
V/ilson himself, it seems, is not certain that the in­
ability of the Lamarckism theory to account for the existen­
ce of sterile organisms was proven fatal to it. Later on 
(V/ilson, 1975a:156), the author comes back to the same prob­
lem again in his discussion of the learning process. And he 
says that if learning is a generalized process whereby each 
brain is stamped afresh by experience, the role of natural 
selection must be solely to keep the tabula rasa of the 
brain clean and malleable. But he disagrees with this. He 
states: "Only small parts of the brain resemble a tabula ra­
sa; this is true even for human beings" (p.156).
How small are the "small parts" of the brain which re-
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semble a tabula rasa is debateable. Although Wilson cites 
the writings of Niko Tinbergen, Peter Marler, Sherwood Wash- 
burn, Hans Kummer, ”and others,” as supporting his thesis, 
there are others who support a different position. Besides 
Sahlins, Waddington, Allen et al. and the others mentioned 
in the section of ”The Critics”, in this study, and who em­
phasize the cultural influences and the learning process
—  16 in the human social behavior, William H. Durham points
out that the human being is subject, from birth, to two 
kinds of selection processes: a) The process of socializa­
tion, in which the ”combined interest of the parents, the 
child, and even the social group as a whole” is selected, 
and 2) The selection of the ”satisfaction” of the organism, 
in which genetic advantage for a neurophysiology which re­
wards with sensory reinforcement and a feeling of "satisfa­
ction” selects those acts likely to enhance survival and 
reproduction, and which produced unpleasant, distressing, 
or painful feedback in response to potentially dangerous 
behaviors (Caplan, 1978:^-31-^32). Proceeding from here, Dur­
ham suggests a”coevolutionary synthesis” based on the hypo­
thesis that
\
selective retention in biological and cul­
tural evolution generally favors those at- 
ributes which increase, or at least do not 
decrease, the ability of individual human 
beings to survive and reproduce in their na­
tural and social environments (p.ZfJfl).
Taking into account both the arguments of sociobiolo-
i
, \
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gists, as well as the arguments of their critics - those 
who emphasize the “fact of culture11, or mentalism according 
to V/ilson - the "amalgam" points to the direction that if 
the concept of natural selection is to survive "unscathed" 
in its application to the evolution of humans, culture 
should be examined as part of the "natural" agents which 
determine selection* This is the first postulate on which 
* the present synthesis is based.
Kin selection:
Kin selection is the concept on which the second pos­
tulate of this synthesis is based. Kin selection (or family
1 n
selection), is the concept which, according to V/ilson r 
"saved" the Darwinian evolutionary theory by explaining 
the existence of sterile organisms, an existence which can 
not be justified on the notion of the survival of the fit­
test (V/ilson, 1975a: 11 ?)• But although kin selection "saved" 
Darwin*s theory, it casts doubts on V/ilson*s wisdom in sear­
ching for biological bases of social behavior (especially in 
humans), in the genes of the individual organisms:
If kin selection is to be accepted, with regard to 
the survival and reproduction of the fittest (in which case 
the object of natural selection is the kin and not the indi­
vidual, who may be sterile), the behavior of the kin - as a 
whole - which maximizes its survival and reproduction abi-
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lity should be influenced - or determined - by the colle­
ction of the genes of all the organisms comprising the kin, 
combined, and not by the genes of individual organisms. Of 
course kin, as an entity, does not replace individual be­
havior (group behavior is not relevant in this point), but 
it does influence the behavior of the individual, who - in 
the case of individual selection - would behave otherwise. 
Thus, acceptance of kin selection necessitates the abandon­
ment of the search for biological bases of social behavior 
- at least the kind of behavior which promotes the survival 
and reproduction of the kin at the expense of the indivi­
dual fitness - in the genes of the individual organism. In 
a word, inclusive fitness can not reside with exclusive 
genes (the genes of the individual).
But if social behavior can not reside with the genes
of the individual organism, then it should be residing (if
the sociobiological explanation is to be followed), with
the genes of the group. But, of course, such genes do not
exisi. Then, what is left, in order to salvage any “hope"
for sociobiology, is the-insistence - based on unsophisti-
18cated logic, which seems to be implied by Wilson - that, 
since natural selection (in the Darwinian theory1s sense), 
selected certain genes, instead of others because of their 
superior fitness, the selected genes must have characteri­
stics which relate them to the selected behavior (characte- 
restics which the non-selected genes lack). But such an un-
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sophisticated logic has a drawback: This argument can not 
withstand scrutiny (especially in the macroscopic level in 
which, according to V/ilson ^  , sociobiology is iterested). 
Examined over long periods of time, natural selection - 
even when culture is taken as an agent in this selection '- 
the randomness with which the process takes place is appa­
rent. For example, when natural selection selected John
D* Rockefeller, Sr., and big business, for survival and re-
20
production - according to his own claim - it was only 
the short-term interest of Rockefeller, his ancestors and 
• descendants that was served. In a possible socialist envi­
ronment, Rockefeller1s genes would not be able to survive. 
Pointing to this is the fate of the czars.
What is obvious here is that social behavior selects 
the genes depending on the space and time that the indivi­
dual carrying those genes happens to exist. But if this is 
the case, the genetic fitness that,supposedly,is transfered 
from generation to generation becomes irrelevant. This ne­
cessitates the search for determinants of social behavior 
to be focused on other directions.
Stratified Determinism:
Without violating the tradition of the "great West­
ern" scientific materialism, which V/ilson - as he claims -
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21follows , and without entering the domain of supernatu­
ral explanations, human behavior mau be explained in a dif- 
ferent way:
22Paul A. Weiss , in his discussion of the strati-
t
fication of living systems, which he sees as ”the gist of 
all lessons learned from biology”, states:
Each sub-system dominates its own subor­
dinates smaller parts within its own 
orbit or domain, as it were, restraining 
their degrees of freedom according to its 
own integral portion of the overall pat­
tern, much as its own degrees of freedom 
have been restrained by the pattern of 
activities of the higher system of which 
it is a part and participant (Koestler,
1968:l/f-15).
Weiss sees this ngist” as being applicable to all 
kinds of systems: From the systems of atoms., and molecules 
to the living organisms and the universe. And he states 
that by analysing the Universe and,
by putting the nieces together again, whe­
ther in reality or just in our minds, can 
yield no complete explanation of the beha­
viour of even the most elementary living 
system (p.7).
And, in order to dispel any doubts concerning the meaning 
of his words, Weiss proceeds by stating that the principle 
of hierarchic order in living nature reveals itself as a 
demonstrable descriptive fact, regardless of the philoso-
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phical connotations that it may carry (p.^ -).
This is determinism stratified in biological terms - 
in terms which can be analysed, discussed and tested accor­
ding to the laws of physics and biology. But in the rela­
tionship between the organic system of the individual and 
the social group, these laws fail to shed any light. And it 
is at that point that sociology enters the debate.
The Sociologists; '
The "principle of hierarchic order" in its applica­
tion to the relationship between humans and the social 
group has been debated extensively. Among those who, contri­
buted to this debate are Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and 
Emile Durkheim:
Auguste Comte ^ recognized this connection between 
the organic systems in its application to the relationship 
between the individual humans and, what he calls, Humani­
ty ^  . And - by attaching to this relationship a hierar­
chic order from Humanity down to the individual human being- 
he urged humans to "worship" (in the new "demonstrated re­
ligion which is about to replace revealed religion"), the 
new Supreme Being, that of Humanity (Comte, 1875:327).
Corate saw the existence and the "irresistible power
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of the true Great Being” as exhibited when reflecting on 
’’how dependent every part of our life, physical or moral, 
is upon time and place”. But he cautions against the danger 
of confusing this Great Being with any physical entity. The 
nature of Humanity, at a given chronological period - accor­
ding to Comte's perception - is the mental inheritance that 
all past human generations have handed down to the contem- 
* porary human group, through moral - or otherwise mental - 
precepts. He describes his notion of Humanity as follows:
For Humanity is not composed of all indi­
viduals or groups of men, past, present, 
and future, taken indiscriminately. There 
can be no true whole'unless the elements 
composing it are in a true sense assimil­
able. Therefore the new Great Being is 
formed by the co-operation, whether in ’ 
time or space, only of such existences as 
as are of a kinred nature with itself; 
excluding such as have proved merely a 
burden to the human race. It is on this 
ground that we regard Humanity as composed 
essentially of the Dead; these are alone 
being fully amenable to our judgement; not 
to speak of their increasing superiority 
in number••••.•••....The present life is 
a period of probation, which after it is 
over results either in exclusion or in 
permanent subjective incorporation into 
the life of Humanity (Comte, 1875:333)•
The significant points in this passage (significant 
in terms of the present discussion), are the following: a) 
The new Great Being is formed by existences (contributions 
by individual humans), which are of kindred nature with Hu­
manity. b) Such contributions (or existences), can only be 
judged in a macro-level, so only the dead can be subjected
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to such a judgement, c) Since the living humans can not he 
judged, their possible existences as being of a kindred 
nature with Humanity is on probation.
The similarity between these words and certain reli­
gious beliefs concerning God's Ultimate Judgement and the 
separation between the immortal and the damned spirits is 
apparent. But, without confusing his positivism with super­
natural beliefs, Comte makes clear that he is referring - 
by the concept of Humanity - to a mental social heritage, 
which may, or may not, characterize social arrangements in 
particular chronological periods (specific arrangements and 
doctrines are on "probation" until they are subjected to 
the judgement of time).
\
t
Herbert Spencer:
Other proponents of the idea that there exist an en­
tity characterizing the social group, have not seen the so­
cial group as a mental one (especially not as consisting of 
the moral heritage handed down by past generations to the 
subsequent ones). For example, Herbert Spencer^in his des­
cription of society as an organism, writes:
It undergoes continuous growth. As it grows* 
its parts become unlike: it exhibits increase 
of structure. The unlike parts simultaneously 
assume activities of unlike kinds. These acti­
vities are not simply different, but their
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differences are so related as to make one 
another possible* The reciprocal aid thus 
given causes mutual dependence of the 
parts. And the mutually-dependent parts, 
living by and for one another, form an 
aggregate constituted on the same general 
principle as is an individual organism. 
The analogy of a society to an organism 
becomes still clearer on learning that 
every organism of appreciable size is a 
society; and on further learning that in 
both, the lives of the units continue for 
some time if the life of the aggregate is 
suddenly arrested, while if the aggregate 
is not destroyed by violence, its life 
greatly exceeds in duration the lives of 
its units. Though the two are contrasted 
as respectively discrete and concrete, 
and though there results a difference in 
the ends subserved by the organization, 
there does not result a difference in the 
laws of the organization: the required 
mutual influences of the parts, not tran­
smissible in a direct way, being, in a 
society, transmitted in an indirect way 
(Spencer, 1969:21-22).
It is apparent from the above description that Spen-
f > 
cer refers to a society comprised of living human beings.
Although his statement that society "undergoes continuous 
growth" indicates that Spencer compares societies of dif­
ferent chronological periods, this comparison regards these 
societies as distinct of each other entities, and no conne­
ction is implied between them in terms of a moral code, 
which develops - according to Conte - all through the human 
history, transcending time and space.
Prom here, Spencer proceeds to deal in a great de­
tail with social growth, social structure, social functions, 
systems of organs, the sustaining system, the distributing
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system, the regulating system, the social types and consti
26tutions, the social metamorphoses .
The distinction between Spencer's society and Com­
t e k  Humanity is clear: Comte's Great Being marches from 
one chronological period to another, integrating in its all 
consuming moral code all worthy "existences" and disregard­
ing the rest, thus reducing reducing humans to the role of 
pilgrims kneeling at the feet of Humanity, Spencer's socie- 
ty is not all consuming. It is a distinct organism indepen­
dent of the individual human organism, and, such a concep­
tion can lead - as in the case of Spencer - to the idea 
that manipulation can take place between the two. This is 
an idea which predominates in Spencer's individualist ap­
proach to the relationship between the individual and soci­
ety. In contrasting his idea of society to that of Comte's, 
Spencer2*^ wrote:
M. Comte's ideal society is one in which 
government is developed to the greatest 
extent - in which class-functions are far 
more under conscious public regulation 
than now - in which hierarchical organiza­
tion with unquestioned authority shall 
guide everything - in which the individual 
life shall be subordinated in the greatest 
degree to the social life.................
That form of society towards which we are 
progressing, I hold to be one in which 
government will be reduced to the smallest 
amount possible, and freedom increased to 
the greatest amount possible - one in which 
human nature will have become so moulded by 
social discipline into fitness for the so­
cial state, that it will need little exter-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
nal restraint, but will be self-restraint-, 
••••••••••••••one in which individual life
will thus be pushed to the greatest extent 
consistent with social life; and in which 
social life will have no other end than to 
maintain the conpletest sphere for indivi­
dual life (Spencer, 1968:17-18)•
_ Although Spencer*s above statement indicates that he
pQ
misunderstood Comte and that he, himself (at least, in
“ 't
the above passage), does not seem to deviate from Comte's
pq
ideas 7 , he arrived at this conflicting conclusion be­
cause he does not seem to make the distinction between the 
social organism as consisting ''primarily" of the dead (the 
heritage handed down to the living humans by past genera­
tions) , which is the idea of the social organism held by 
Corate, and his own emphasis of the social organism as the 
social, economic, and political arrangements of a society 
consisting of living humans. This prompts Stanislav Andre- 
ski 3 0 -to write:
Spencer did not succeed in improving upon 
Comte, Actually, reading Spencer's essay 
'On the Reasons for Disagreeing with M, 
Comte', one is struck by the latter's su­
periority as a philosopher of science. In 
empirical sociology, on the other hand, it 
was the other way round; and here Spencer's 
theorizing was much more scientific even 
when it was mistaken; because he made a se­
rious attempt to base his theories on fac­
tual information, which is scanty in Comte 
(Spencer, 1972:16).
Andreski - in the above passage - clearly indicates 
the differences between Comte ans Spencer with regard to
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their relevance to modern sociology; differences which stem 
from their differing emphasis placed on the two aspects of 
society: a) The moral, which is comprised "primarily" of 
past generations (Comte’s Humanity) and b) The materialistic 
existence of living humans, which is more emphasized by 
Spencer,
This distinction in the understanding of the social 
group between Comte and Spencer, lies at the root of the 
conflict between the proponents of individualism and those 
of socialism: The specific manifestation of society within 
a certain chronological period, may seems to emphasize ei­
ther the importance of the individual or the importance of 
the group. This depends on the specific social, economic 
and political arrangements of the period under examination. 
It is only when the life of society is examined as tran­
scending space and time, that the importance of the group
becomes overwhelming. Under the light of such an examina-
\
tion, the individual becomes.nothing more than Homo habilis 
(early man), with no consciousness or language, philosophy, 
science or technology,
Emile Durkheim:
Emile Durkheim ^  , in his contributions to sociolo-
(
gy,attempts to combine both the views of Comte and Spencer, 
This is apparent in his definition of society. He emphasized
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both the moral heritage and the structure, of contemporary
societies in his studies. For exmple, in "The science of 
32Morality" , in which he discusses the sources and nature 
of morality, Durkheim writes:
There is hardly any event of any importance 
in society which does not have repercus­
sions upon morality and influence it. The 
economists, it is true, have only drawn our 
attention to certain of these which parti­
cularly interest them: but it is easy to ge- 
neralise the conclusions which they have 
arrived at. This being the case, it is just 
as impossible to draw a radical,separation 
between ethics, political economy, stati­
stics and the science of positive law, as 
it is to study the nervous system in abstra' 
ction from other organs and other functions 
(Durkheim, 1972:95)*
In pointing to the difference between his perception 
of society and that of Spencer1s, Durkheim wrote:
Whatever efforts the latter Spencer might 
have made to overhaul utilitarianism, his 
fundamental postulate is still formulated ' 
in the same way as that of the utilita­
rians, holding that the objective of mora­
lity is the advancement of the life of the 
individual, and that the good and the use­
ful are synonymous terms (p.90)*
s
And - in summarizing his perception of society, Durk 
heim points out to his belief that morality is the product 
of society and not the product of the individual humans who 
compose it. Morality, according to Durkheim, is not intrin­
sic to individuals but to society:
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Society is not, then, as has often been 
believed, a stranger to the moral world, 
or something which has only secondary 
repercussions upon it; it is, on the con­
trary, the necessary condition of its 
existence* Society is not a simple aggre­
gate of individuals who, when they enter 
it, bring their own intrinsic morality 
with them; rather, man is a moral being 
only because he lives in society, since 
morality consists in being solidary with 
a group and varies with this solidarity.
Let all social life disappear, and moral 
life would disappear with it, since it 
would no longer have any objective (p.101).
Durkheim - in his studies of morality - does not re­
main in the domain of philosophy, as Comte does. With his 
studies of “Suicide" and “The division of labour" (Durkheim, 
1972), looks at the contemporary societies in order to esta­
blish social "facts" and the relationship between the indi­
vidual and society. In this he resembles Spencer who attem­
pted to establish the nature of the structure of society.
But with an important difference: Whereas Spencer saw the 
-structure of society as deriving through the initiative of 
the individual, Durkheim looked at it as the derivative of 
the intrinsic nature of society as a sovereign organism.
A S?,rnthesis:
If evolutionary biology (including sociobiology), 
accepts - as it claims - that biological evolution is still 
an ongoing process, then the human organism is not an "is-
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land” in the sea of evolution. In an evolutionary process 
- and in its chronologically transcendent life - there 
come chronological periods when the human organism is non­
existent, it is in its early stages of birth and develop­
ment, it becomes the central focus and, again, it surren­
ders priority to more complex forms of life until it be­
comes extinct. This is inevitable to happen - sooner or la- 
• ter - in an ongoing biological evolution. Except, that it 
is, if the definition of the human organism changes with 
the changing evolutionary stages, permitting, thus, the 
extension - in time - of the supremacy of the human orga­
nism.
Such a changing definition is apparent in the Durk- 
heimian arguments against Hobbes, Housseau and Spencer: 
Durkheim accuses them as seeing the individual as being 
"the sole reality of the human realm", whereas Durkheim, 
himself, sees society as another such human realm which is 
"superior" to man (physically, intellectually and morally), 
and before which man "bows" (Durkheim, 1972:99-100)*
Durkheim1s definition of the human realm is compati­
ble with Comte's Great Being, as well as Weiss's stratified 
determinism, and the arguments of all those who emphasize 
the role of culture in human social behavior. But this pre­
sent the student of human social behavior with the basic 
problem of defining what an idividual human being is. As-
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sumptions about human nature, when such a "nature” is de­
pendent upon space and time, according to Comte, the other 
sociologists (but, of course, the evolutionary biologists 
as,well), do not suffice. In an ongoing evolutionary pro­
cess in which the humans are included (whether as subjects 
or objects, it is immaterial), there is no static human 
nature. In an ongoing evolutionary process, space and time 
are- inseparable terms in the definition of human nature.
And, above all, in an evolutionary process, the several 
stages in the evolution of the organism (which.are, unavoid­
ably, related at any given time), must be taken into ac­
count, Weiss ^  advice for "stratifying” determinism in the 
examination of living systems can not be ignored. Each sub­
system, Weiss states, "dominates" its own subordinates 
smaller parts within its own orbit or domain, "restraining" 
their degrees of freedom according to its own integral por­
tion of the overall pattern (Koestler, 1968:1 A— 15)•
If attempts to "tear" the machinery (the genes and 
the DNA) down, are successful - as Wilson ^  hopes - the 
highest achievement would be the knowledge of a relation­
ship between the genes and behavior. Such a knowledge, as 
Grene ^  notes does not shed light on the way mind works:
To discover the biological conditions for 
mental development is not to say how, wi­
thin those conditions, mind works (Gregory, 
1978:219).
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But such a knowledge is not a worthwhile enough goal 
for sociobiology. V/ilson sees the role of sociobiology 
as a) Attempting to reconstruct the history of the machi­
nery and b) To identify the adaptive significance of each 
of its functions (V/ilson, 1975a:575)*
Up to now, sociobiology has been unable to make any
36inroads in either of the above areas. V/ilson himself 
accepts the inability of sociobiology to explain "at best11 
more than a Mtiny fraction" of human social behavior. He 
writes:
Contemporary general sociobiology might 
at best explain a tiny fraction of human 
social behavior in a novel manner,(Cap- 
lan, 1978:xiii).
Of course, V/ilson hopes for more success in the fu­
ture of sociobiology:
Its full applicability will be settled 
only by a great deal more imaginative 
research by both evolutionary biologists 
and social scientists. In this sense the 
true, creative debate has just begun 
(Caplan, 1978:xiii-xiv).
But in order for sociobiology to achieve a more fruit 
ful future, it needs to take into account another type of 
DNA: the one that acts in such a way as to influence (or de­
termine?), the relations between the members of the group:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
the Socibrain. The collective ways of acting or thinking 
which have, according to Durkheim, a reality "outside" the 
individuals (Giddens, 1972:71), and which are manifested in 
philosophy, science, arts, the communication media etc.).
In order for sociobiology to gain a wider perspective 
of v/hat it is looking at, the following concepts are sugge- 
sted for examination:
Biobody: The "naked" body (literally and metaphorically): 
With its natural drives, passions and desires as they have 
evolved up to now, and as they keep evolving (and when they 
are unaffected by any social constraints and social conven­
tions). This the individual that sociobiology, now,is look­
ing at, and it hopes to explain its behavior genetically.
Biobrain: This is essentially a part of the biobody as a 
mass of neurons situated in the cerebral hemisphere of the 
biobody, and which functions primarily as an informer to, 
and co-ordinator and integrator of, the drives in order to 
enable the biobody to survive and prosper. This is the na­
ture of the biobrain when unaffected by the social group 
(or sociobiology1s hin), in which case it may become an "a- 
gent" of the group at the expense - or for the benefit - 
of the carrying organism.
Sociobody: The socially bound idea of what a human body is
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'(whether it is a soul-carrying device or a plain mass of 
flesh), what is "good" and "bad** about the human body and, 
generally, the culturally bound beliefs, ideas and opini­
ons with regard to the human body. Through the historical 
examination of the idea of the sociobody, it could be de­
termined which characteristics of the biobody evolved as 
an individual organic necessity and which ones evolved as 
social requirement.
Sociobrain; The collective ways of acting and thinking 
which have, according to Durkheim, a reality "outside” the 
individual (Giddens, 1972:71). The sociobrain comprises all 
the social laws and conventions (political ideologies, re­
ligious beliefs, social values and norms, arts etc.). It is 
important to note that the sociobrain, during its function, 
does not coordinate, regulate or integrate the requirements 
of the biobody as perceived by the individual, but as per­
ceived by the social group as a distinguishable entity (in 
effect, the sociobrain "rules" over the sociobody and not 
the biobody). And this practice forces the biobody to under­
go - eventually - substantial changes in its physique and 
function..
In the past, because of the limited scope and the 
simplicity of the social realm (sociobrain), humans enjoyed 
a high degree of independence (through, both the effortless 
inernalization of the social realm and its limited scope).
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But, the expanding sophistication of the sociobrain (espe­
cially with regard to scientific and technological develop­
ments) , permits an individual numan to master only a tiny 
fraction of it, a fact which does not promote individuality 
and creates a cybernetic relationship between the individu­
al and society based on the Dictatorship of the Sociobrain.
The sociobrain is not independent of either the .bio­
body and biobrain or the sociobody. There is a constant in­
teraction between them, which is expressed, very clearly, 
in the following words by Charles Horton Cooley ^  where an
i
organic relationship between the individual and society is 
suggested:
If we accept the evolutionary point of 
view we are led to see the relation be­
tween society and the individual as an 
organic relation. That is, we see that 
the individual is not separable from the 
human whole, but a living member of it, 
deriving his life from the whole.through 
social and hereditary transmission as 
truly as if men were literally one body 
(Cooley, 196V. 35).
In another instance, Cooley ^  cautions against re­
garding any of the factors in a social environment as "more 
ultimate” than the others, or overlooking ”the subordination 
of each to the whole, or to conceive one as precedent to o~ 
thers”:
The organic view of history denies that
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any factor or factors are more ultimate 
than others. Indeed it denies that the 
so-called factors - such as the mind, 
the various institutions, the physical 
environment, and so on - have any real 
existence apart from a total life in 
which all share in the same way that the 
members of the body share in the life of 
the animal organism. It looks upon mind 
and matter, soil, climate, flora, fauna, 
thought, language, and institutions as 
aspects of a single rounded whole, one 
total growth. Y/e may concentrate atten­
tion upon some one of these things, but 
this concentration should never go so 
far as to overlook the subordination of 
each to the whole, or to conceive one as 
precedent to others (Barnes, 1970:836).
This view of Cooley is in line with Freedman's ^ 9  p0_ 
sition that "we are totally biological, totally environmen­
tal" (Freedman, 1979:1^1), and that there is no way to sepa­
rate the genetic and the learned for they are permanently 
glued together" (p. 1^ 4-). But both Cooley's and Freedman's 
views can apply only in cases where the process, as well as 
the agents of socialization are constant and monolithic, 
permitting thus the uniformity of social influences on. all 
the individuals and in different chronological periods. This
i,
is, of- course, impossible in an evolutionary process where
*
both the individual and social "factors" are in constant 
change and the relationship between them is - subsequently - 
in continuous reorganization, in their quest for equilibrium.
The ever changing biobody of the individual humans 
(according to the evolutionary biology), the ver changing 
physical environment (climate, soil, flora, natural resour-
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ces), and the constant reorganization of the sociobrain 
(changing philosophies, art forms, social institutions, 
means of communication), do not promote the idea of a "sin­
gle rounded whole11, as Cooley suggests, or a static harmo­
nious relationship between these "factors". The dynamic in­
terrelationships of the constituent parts of the "Great 
Being" lead, inevitably, to the pre-eminence of a certain 
part in different chronological periods, Sorokin's ^  dis­
tinction between "sensate", "idealistic" and "ideational" 
periods in human cultural development•is an example of the
changing pre-eminence of the factors constituting the so­
cial group.
Looking at the present chronological period of the 
life of humans and their relationship to the sociobrain, 
most societies exhibit a pre-eminence of the latter. As 
V/ald ^  states, in his rejection of the sociobiological pre 
mise that genes are a limiting factor in human social beha­
vior, "the limiting factors in modern human performance are 
primarily social', economic, and political" (Gregory, 1978: 
277).
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CONCLUSION
Pure sociobiological theory, according to Wilson 
(Gregory, 1978:3-^)> does not imply by itself that human 
social behavior is determined be genes* It allowe, he sta­
tes, for the following three possibilities:
1) That the human brain has evolved to the point 
that it has become an equipotential learning machine en­
tirely determined by culture. The mind, in other words, 
has been freed from the genes. 2) That human social beha­
vior is under genetic constraint but that all of the gene­
tic variability within the human species has been exhausted. 
Hence our behavior is to some extent influenced by genes, 
but we all heve exactly the same potential. 3) That the 
human species is prescribed to some extent but also dis­
plays some genetic differences among individuals. As a con­
sequence, human populations retain the capacity to evolve 
still further in their biological capacity for social beha­
vior (Gregory, 1 978:3-*f) r
The author considers it “virtually11 certain that "the
83
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third alternative is the correct one” (p.if). Based on this 
conviction, Wilson (1975a), proceeds to study the biologi­
cal bases of human social behavior* As a result of his 
studies, he reaches the "conclusion" that homo sapiens is 
a "typical animal species with reference to the quality 
and magnitute of the genetic diversity affecting its beha­
vior" (p.6)* And he sums up:
If social scientists and sociobiologists 
somehow choose to ignore this line of 
investigation, they will soon find human 
geneticists coming up on their blind side* 
The intense interest in medical genetics, 
fueled now by n^w methods such as the e~ 
lectrophoretic separation of proteins and 
rapid sequencing of amino acids, has re­
sulted in an acceleration of discoveries 
in human heredity that is certain to have 
profound consequences for the study of 
genetics of social behavior (p.7)*
Althoq) Wilson - and sociobiology in general - pro­
fess to follow Darwin's evolutionary theory, it seems that 
ar some point in time they abandoned the rigorous applica­
tion of the rules of evolution in their theorizing: Socio­
biology follows the evolutionary process from the appearance 
of life on earth,through its evolution to modern man. But, 
somehow, at this stage, it sees evolution as coming to an 
abrupt end. Man is regarded as a "finished" product, isola­
ted from its environmental (including social), surroundings. 
Sociobiology isolates man and looks for causal factors in 
human social behavior in the genes and the DNA.
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Following Paul A. Weiss in his discussion of the 
stratification of living systems, and the "principle of hi­
erarchic order11, the search for causes of the human social 
behavior at the level of the human genes becomes futile 
theoretically. The organic models of society proposed by 
Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim and Herbert Spencer are addi­
tional support towards the same direction, Teilhard De Char­
d i ns  "noosphere11 indicates the demise of the genes.
How fal; sociobiology will be able to go in challeng­
ing Weiss, the sociologists and Teilhard De Chardin in un­
known at present. But theoreticall, at least, sociobiology 
does not seem to head towards a bright future. If the Dar­
winian theory of evolution is accepted (together with na­
tural selection), it follows that the human genes now exist­
ing must be able to •permit human behavior acceptable to to­
day's social requirements. But to proceed from here, theo­
retically, and suggests that - because of the operation of 
natural selection - these genes may be limiting, in any de­
finitive way, or determining social behavior, it is a leap 
of faith.
In looking at the relationship betv/een the social 
group and the individual human, it seems that, increasingly, 
the individual-in his relationship to the sociobrain - re­
sembles the body-cell in its relationship to the individual 
human. As the cell represents a consciousless, senseless and
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negligible part of the individual, the future individual - 
in turn - nay become the consciousless, senseless and negli­
gible part of Conte's Great Being, But such a fate - if in 
the "cards" - can only be envisioned in the distant future. 
In'relation to such a future, the "Great Being" is, present­
ly, in the stage of its pre-history.
However, the movement towards that direction depends 
on the ability of the individual to master information de­
riving from the sociobrain. The more information the indi­
vidual is able to master, the more the idividual's ability 
is enhanced in influencing - or even determining - the na­
ture and the direction of the sociobrain. Presently, as 
V/ald (Gregory,1978:277),states "the limiting factors in mo­
dern human performance are primarily social, economic, and 
political". Society's grasp on the individual is choking- 
tight. But with the development of the silicon chips (those 
marvellous devices used in the micro-computers as informa­
tion carriers), there is still hope for miracles in the re­
lationship between the elements of society (the individual 
and the group). The implantation of one or two silicon chips 
in the human skull could possibly result to the rebirth of 
the individual as an influencing element of the group......
The dictatorship of-the sociobrain, however, is tem­
porary in the development of the organism. It takes place be 
cause the lower level of the organism (the individual human)
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is still self-sufficient enough to resist the power of the 
higher level of the organism. In further growth of society, 
when the individual will become more dependent on the higher 
level of the organism, the dictatorship will disappear. This 
greater dependence, when - and if - comes, it will not be 
forcefully imposed on the individual. It will be a natural
development in the growth of the humans from a less comlex
r
to a more complex organism:
THE INDIVIDUAL 
AND SOCIETY
Society... Virtues...
Justice, Resolution, Moderation...
He counts them one by one:
Justice, Resolution, Moderation.
Society... Virtues...
They give him the "goose bumps"; 
his stomach gets tied up in knobs; 
he feels like a caged eagle...
And he yearns for solitary peaks; 
and he yearns for liberty and freedom. 
Society... Virtues...
They give him the "goose bumps"; 
his stomach gets tied up in knobs;
/
he feels like a caged eagle...
But the revolt is temporary.
The lapse lasts only for a minute:
He remembers the jungle and the predators; 
he remembers the spirits and the erinyes; 
he remembers'the Merchant of Venice.
And he opens his eyes again:
Society... Virtues...
But they are my Virtues!
But it is my Society!
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